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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
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Policy Research Working Paper 5389
This paper investigates corruption and tax evasion and 
their firm-level determinants across 25,000 firms in 57 
countries, a large fraction of which are small and medium 
enterprises in developing countries. Firms that pay more 
bribes also evade more taxes. Corruption acts as a tax on 
innovation, particularly that of small and young firms. 
Innovating firms pay a larger percentage of their revenues 
in bribes to government officials than non-innovating 
This paper—a product of the Finance and Private Sector Development Team, Development Research Group—is part of 
a larger effort in the department to understand corruption and governance issues. Policy Research Working Papers are 
also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at Ademirguckunt@worldbank.org.   
firms. They do not, however, pay more protection money 
to private parties than other firms. Comparing the 
magnitudes of bribes and taxes evaded, innovating firms 
and firms that use formal finance are more likely to be 
net victims. The findings point to the challenges facing 
innovators in developing countries and the role of banks 
in curbing corruption and tax evasion.  
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1. Introduction 
The adverse effects of corruption on growth and development across countries are the subject of 
much attention in economics and finance 
1 and among policy makers.
2 It is also widely 
recognized that innovation and entrepreneurship are the engines of economic growth and that 
understanding the determinants of innovation is a crucial first step in understanding the 
differences in technological progress and income levels across countries.
3 However, there has 
been very little research exploring the link between these two key determinants of growth. While 
there is evidence that corruption reduces growth at the macro level, we know little about whether 
the effects of corruption are particularly adverse for certain types of firms such as innovators. 
Similarly, while the existing empirical literature on firm innovation has focused on the 
characteristics of the entrepreneur and the firm, we know little about whether innovators pay 
more bribes because it enables them to avoid bureaucratic regulation or whether innovators are 
particularly targeted by corrupt officials.  
In this paper, we study bribery of government officials and tax evasion and how these 
activities are associated with innovation and financial development. We investigate whether 
firms are victims, who pay more in bribes than they gain by underreporting revenues to tax 
authorities, or perpetrators, who gain more by avoiding taxes than they lose in paying bribes.
4 Of 
particular interest is the effect of corruption and tax evasion on innovative firms. Murphy, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1993) argue that innovators are more vulnerable to public corruption than 
established firms since they have a high (and inelastic) demand for government-supplied goods 
such as permits and licenses.  
                                                 
1 See Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Mauro, 1995; Ades and Di Tella, 1997. Svensson (2003, 2005) provides detailed 
reviews on this subject. 
2 Over the period 1990 to 2006, the World Bank Group approved more than $20 billion in public sector reform 
programs, a key component of which were anti-corruption and governance programs. In 2007, the World Bank 
launched the Governance and Anticorruption (GAC) Implementation plan to heighten its focus on combating 
corruption as an integral part of its mandate to reduce poverty and promote growth. 
3 See, for example, Schumpeter (1934,1942), Baumol (2002) and Aghion and Durlauf (2005) on the importance of 
innovation for growth and development. Hall and Jones (1999) show that differences in income levels across 
countries can be explained by differences in their technological progress. 
4 Thus, we focus on corruption that is costly to the firm rather than being a benefit to the firm and a cost to society. 
While both kinds of corruption exist, the literature has generally reached a consensus that corruption is a cost to 
entrepreneurs rather than “grease”. Several papers using surveys report corruption as being an important obstacle to 
doing business (Beck et al., 2005; Fisman and Svensson, 2007; Johnson et al., 2002; Hellman et al., 2003). On a 
cross-country level, other studies show that corruption hinders growth and investment (Mauro,1995; De Soto,1989; 
Frye and Shleifer, 1997; Berkowitz and Li, 2000; Safavian, 2001;Svensson, 2003and Ahlin and Pang ,2008) 3 
 
We examine the following questions:  
  Which firm characteristics, e.g. size, age, industry, and legal status are associated 
with bribe payments and underreporting of revenues to tax authorities?  
  Is corruption a tax on innovation? Are there particular innovative activities such as 
introducing new products and introducing new technology, associated with greater 
bribe payments to government officials? Do innovative firms that bribe receive 
special advantages in dealing with bureaucracy and regulation?  
  Do firms that pay more bribes also evade more taxes? Do firm characteristics explain 
whether a firm is on balance a victim or perpetrator across countries?  
  What is the role of the financial system in limiting the extent of underreporting of 
income? How do banks compare with informal financing channels in curbing illegal 
behavior? 
To answer these questions, we use a rich multi-country data set, the World Bank 
Enterprise Surveys, sampling over 25,000 firms (80% of which are small and medium 
enterprises) in 57 countries (50 low and middle income countries and 7 high-income countries). 
The surveys provide information on firms’ innovation projects, bribe payments, tax evasion, 
their perception of the government, and their sources of financing. Our data is unique in three 
aspects. First, the data allows us to examine firm behavior in small and medium enterprises in 
developing countries, which haven’t been the focus of earlier studies though such firms account 
for the overwhelming majority of firms in developing countries. Second, the survey tracks 
specific activities that result in new-to-firm innovation.  New-to-firm innovation consists of 
improvements such as new product introductions or use of new technologies, which is of more 
relevance for our sample of developing countries where firms are less likely to develop globally 
new technologies (e.g. Segerstrom, 1991; Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Acemoglu, Aghion, 
and Zilibotti, 2006; Dutz, 2007). This perspective on innovation also fits in with the claim by 
Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1993)  that “..public rent-seeking attacks innovation, since 
innovators need government-supplied goods such as permits, licenses, import quotas, and so on, 
much more so than established producers.” Third, for the very first time, we have consistently 4 
 
collected data across a large cross-section of countries on both types of firm behaviors – their 
role as victims proxied by the percentage of revenue that they pay as gifts or informal payments 
to public officials to “get things done” as well as their role as perpetrators proxied by the 
percentage of income that they hide from tax authorities.
5 Similar data has been used by several 
papers, including Svensson (2005) and Fisman and Svensson (2007) in a single country context. 
Note that since our sample is dominated by small and medium enterprises, the corruption being 
measured is small scale bribe payments to government officials of different agencies to obtain 
business licenses and access to essential services. 
We find that about 40% of the firms in our sample neither pay bribes nor underreport 
revenue for tax purposes, 23% do both, 14% only pay bribes, and another 23% only underreport 
revenue. Univariate statistics show that there is a wide variation in the distribution of firms 
paying and not-paying bribes across countries and firm characteristics such as size, legal status, 
industry composition, domestic or foreign ownership and exporting status. In particular, 
summary statistics show that firms in more regulated economies pay more bribes as well as 
evade more taxes. 
When we examine firm characteristics associated with bribe payments in a multivariate 
setting, we find that smaller and younger firms report paying a larger percentage of their sales as 
bribe payments. Individual or family owned firms pay higher bribes than if the firm was owned 
by another corporation, bank, investment fund, manager / employees of the firm or the state. 
Controlling for country and industry fixed effects and several firm characteristics, we find that 
the log odds of having to pay bribes increases by 0.310 for innovators compared to non-
innovators. Thus, in our sample of countries, corruption acts as a tax on innovation. However, we 
find no association between innovation and private protection payments to organized crime to 
prevent violence. This is consistent with Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1993) who differentiate 
between private and public rent-seeking and argue that private rent-seeking attacks the 
productive rather than the innovative sector of the economy where as public rent-seeking 
particularly targets the innovators. 
                                                 
5 In robustness tests, we also examine the under-reporting of total workforce and the wage bill for tax purposes, 
which may be other important measures of tax evasion in developing countries. The survey and the steps takes to 
induce reliable and accurate survey responses are provided in the data section of the paper. 5 
 
We do not find that the firms that pay bribes obtain greater benefits in obtaining 
government services than firms that do not pay bribes.  
We also find that there is a significant association between bribes and tax evasion. Firms 
that pay bribes underreport their revenue on average by 6.13% more than firms that do not pay 
bribes. This is consistent with theories that suggest that government corruption breaks an implicit 
contract between citizens and the state, causing firms to retaliate by evading taxes. In 
instrumental variable regressions, using time spent dealing with government officials (other than 
the tax inspectorate) as an instrument for bribes, we find a significant causal association between 
bribe payments and tax evasion.  
When we examine the net burden of corruption on innovators, we find that while some 
innovators do retaliate by evading taxes, overall innovators are more likely to be victims, who 
pay bribes and not evade taxes, than perpetrators, who do not pay bribes but evade taxes. 
Finally, firms that use bank finance to finance their new investments and working capital 
are more likely to pay bribes and not evade taxes, whereas firms that use informal financing and 
financing from family and friends and other sources are more likely to evade taxes and not have 
to pay bribes.  
We obtain similar results after several robustness checks, including estimating on a sub-
sample of countries in Europe and Central Asia (BEEPS Sample) that has alternate measures of 
tax evasion (wage-bill and labor) and bribes and also allows us to better control for profitability. 
Our paper contributes to our understanding of the relations between corruption, 
innovation and formal financing in several ways. First, most cross-country corruption studies 
treat countries as monoliths without attention to corruption in particular firms or industries. By 
contrast, we focus on firms and industries, in particular innovative firms. Second, existing 
research takes the approach that firms in countries where corruption is rife, are victims of illegal 
activity by government officials, and thus most studies focus only on bribe payments and firm 
performance (e.g. Kaufmann and Wei, 1998; Svensson, 2001; Fisman and Svensson, 2007). We 
take a broader approach in viewing firms as both victims and perpetrators and analyzing the 
relation of corrupt behavior with innovation and financing decisions.  6 
 
We focus on the external governance environment. This is the first paper to examine tax 
avoidance activities in innovating firms in developing economies. The tax avoidance literature in 
finance (e.g. Weisbach, 2002; Desai and Dharmapala, 2006, 2008; Desai, Dyck, and Zingales, 
2007) focuses on the importance of corporate governance in reducing managerial diversion in 
large publicly traded firms in the US. We study smaller firms, many of them family controlled, 
and focus on the link between financial intermediaries as external monitors and tax avoidance. In 
our analysis of tax evasion, we abstract away from corporate governance implications examined 
in the literature, and which are of more relevance to large firms in developed countries.
6  
The analysis in this paper has significant implications for anti-corruption policy reforms 
7 
and those geared towards improving tax collection and administration. Our results suggest that 
financial sector reform is integral to this debate since formal financial intermediation plays a 
critical role in helping curb tax evasion. The link between bank monitoring and reduced firm 
illegality is part of the policy debate on the role played by banks and informal institutional 
networks in stimulating growth. There is a large literature (reviewed in Levine,2005) that shows 
that a good banking sector is critical for growth and firm innovation (e.g. Ayyagari, Demirguc-
Kunt, and Maksimovic, 2010; De Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff, 2009). We show that informal 
financing channels are also associated with negative outcomes such as increased tax evasion, 
thus underlining the benefits of financial sector reform.  
The rest of the paper is as follows: Section 2 lays out our framework. Section 3 describes 
the data and empirical methodology. Section 4 presents summary statistics and Section 5 
presents results from our empirical estimations. In Section 6 we present robustness checks across 
a smaller sample of countries with more detailed data. Section 7 concludes. 
                                                 
6 The principal agent framework in the Desai and Dharmapala papers analyzes agency issues between shareholders 
and managers. It is unclear that this is the appropriate framework in developing countries where the nature of the 
agency problem is very different due to the prevalence of concentrated insider ownership structures.
 
7 Corruption has been at the forefront of policy reform. However, as highlighted by a recent World Bank report and 
profiled in a Washington Post editorial (“Corruption Reality Check”, May 2008), much of this reform money 
achieved no results and what little progress that took place was in countries where it was needed the least.  7 
 
2.  A Framework to Study the Relation between Corruption, Tax Evasion, Financing 
and Innovation 
Consider a simple set-up where some of the firms in our survey during the course of doing 
business, pay bribes to government officials and/or evade taxes. Some of these firms are also 
innovators who undertake an innovation opportunity that needs to be provided a government 
license or approval and financing. Below we elaborate on the corruption technology and present 
a framework to understand the link between corruption, tax evasion, innovation and financing. 
First, consistent with Ades and Di-Tella (1999), we view bribe payments by firms as an 
illegal tax or fee levied by government officials who have the power to hold up a firm by 
denying services. This interpretation fits the type of corruption that we investigate empirically 
below. The firms that we analyze in our sample are relatively small and are unlikely to have 
market power in the market for corruption. Moreover, as discussed below, much of the bribery is 
to providers of routine services.
8 
Safavian (2001) and Svensson (2003) find that bureaucrats tailor bribes to firms’ ability 
to pay. Thus, the characteristics of firms that will be extorted by officials depend on the 
opportunities for extortion and the likelihood of punishment. We conjecture that firms in some 
industries, like construction, which are usually regulated and subject to inspection are 
particularly subject to extortion by government officials.  Below, we use cross-country data to 
examine the relation between firm size, ownership structure, and industry, and bribe paying. We 
also investigate whether these firm characteristics predict tax underreporting. 
Second, to understand the effect on the innovators among our sample of firms we follow 
Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1993) who argue that innovators are particularly vulnerable to 
extortion from government officials because they are not part of the entrenched lobbies; they are 
often credit-constrained and hence can be more easily deterred by public rent-seeking; and the 
nature of their projects (long-term, slow accumulation of capital, risky) offer more opportunities 
for rent seekers.
9 Thus, innovations that involve activities such as changing the physical layout of 
a factory or office space, installing telephones, acquiring motor vehicles, opening new premises, 
                                                 
8 We find no evidence that firms that pay bribes outperform firms that do not. 
9 We test for this link between innovation and bribes below. 8 
 
importing a new category of goods, or registering a new trademark, increase interactions with 
government employees who have the power to extort the firm, and thus increase the likelihood 
that innovating firms pay more bribes than non-innovators. Our data (to be discussed below) 
supports this view that the innovating firms that pay bribes are victimized by government 
corruption rather than benefiting through special favors from government officials compared to 
other firms. 
The relation between innovation and corruption has several implications: First, being 
victimized by the government officials might affect the firm’s compliance with government rules 
in other contexts, more specifically, the tax collection system. Thus, the firms could try to recoup 
some of their losses by evading taxes. Second, extorted firms might resort to informal financing 
channels in order to facilitate tax avoidance. We explore both these possibilities in detail below. 
 
2.1. Corruption and Tax Evasion 
There are several reasons to expect that firms shaken down by government officials respond by 
greater underreporting of income to the tax authorities.  Much research on the role of taxpayer 
morale in public finance suggests that compliance with tax regulation rests on a belief in the 
legitimacy of the tax process and trust in government. This work suggests that if the implicit 
contract between the government and the taxpayer is broken, the firm is likely to evade taxes.
10  
While much of this literature rests on behavioral notions of fairness, several authors 
suggest that tax avoidance may be a rational response to extortion by government officials. In an 
asymmetric information model, extortion of a bribe provides a signal to the firm that the 
government is dishonest and that there is a lower probability that the taxes will be used for 
services that the taxpayer implicitly expects. Several papers (e.g. Alm, McClelland, and Schulze, 
1992; Alm, Jackson and McKee, 1992a; 1992b; 1993; and Pommerehne, Hart, and Frey, 1994) 
show that this creates incentives for firms to evade taxes at the margin and use the saved funds to 
                                                 
10 Taxpayers are more likely to refrain from cheating if they trust the government (Scholz and Lubell, 1998; Scholz 
and Pinney, 1995; Torgler, 2007) and are satisfied with government performance (Spicer and Lundstedt (1976), 
Smith (1992), Alm, Jackson and McKee (1992), Pommerehne, Hart, and Frey (1994)). Therefore, if, as suggested by 
the trust literature, bribes demanded by public officials are a signal to the firm that the government is dishonest, it 
leads to loss of trust in the government and thus to tax evasion.  9 
 
provide those services.
11 Below we investigate both the existence of an association between 
bribery and tax evasion by underreporting firm revenues and the existence of a causal relation 
between the two. To explore the latter we use time spent with government officials (other than 
the tax inspectorate) as an instrument.  A greater time spent dealing with government officials is 
likely to be correlated with greater needs for approvals from these officials, and thus, 
opportunities for the officials to extort bribe payments. The bribe payments, in turn, provide a 
signal that government officials are not trustworthy, making these firms more likely to evade 
taxes. 
2.2  Formal versus Informal Financing 
A further consequence of being shaken down by public officials is that firms may resort to 
alternate financing channels. Firms can finance the investment and payoffs to officials required 
to innovate in three ways. They can self-finance using retained earnings net of taxes, or obtain 
external financing from either a bank or from informal sources. Firms face a trade-off in going to 
banks versus informal sources. On one hand, as formal intermediaries, banks have a lower cost 
of capital and can make loans at a lower cost. On the other hand, banks need verifiable proof that 
the borrowing firm can repay the loan and thus evidence of current income as disclosed by the 
firm.
12 Hence the firms are able to evade less tax if they were to raise money from formal 
sources.  
This suggests a possible relation between the development of the financial sector and 
innovation in countries with significant corruption problems. Corruption may affect the use of 
the formal financial system by firms. To investigate whether firms benefit or are hurt on balance, 
we first classify firms as being victims, who pay bribes but do not underreport revenues to tax 
authorities, or perpetrators, who underreport revenues to tax authorities but do not pay bribes (we 
assume that firms who don’t pay bribes and don’t evade taxes and those that bribe and evade 
taxes net out to zero benefit on the illegality stakes).  It is then an empirical question as to 
whether we should expect innovators and bank financed firms to be more likely victims than 
                                                 
11 Thus, for example, extortion by police might cause a firm to doubt that the state will provide adequate protection 
from violent crime in future years and to evade taxes, using some of the saved funds to purchase private security. 
12 Thus, we are assuming that the bank cannot verify the existence of income and assets not reported to the tax 
authorities. This is analogous to the assumption in corporate finance in Hart and Moore (1995) and Bolton and 
Scharfstein (1996). 10 
 
perpetrators. Thus corruption by public officials may also have an adverse externality on the use 
of the formal financial system by innovating firms, with potentially additional implications for 
revenue collection and development. 
To summarize, we explore four main questions in our empirical analysis below: 
1.  Do innovating firms pay more bribes than non-innovators? 
2.  Do firms that pay bribes also evade more taxes? 
3.  Considering the net burden of corruption, are innovating firms more likely to be 
victims who pay bribes but do not underreport revenue to tax authorities or are they 
perpetrators who don’t pay bribes but underreport revenue? 
4.  Are bank financed firms more likely to be victims than perpetrators? 
3.  Data and Empirical Methodology 
We use the World Bank Enterprise Surveys (ES) that use standardized survey instruments to 
benchmark the investment climate of individual economies across the world and to analyze firm 
behavior and performance.  The surveys sample from the universe of registered businesses in 
each country using standardized survey instruments and follow a stratified random sampling 
methodology.
13 All the surveys in our sample were administered during 2002-2005.   
The ES surveys have two unique advantages that make them suitable for investigating the 
relation between innovation, corruption, and tax underreporting. First, the surveys contain 
information on both types of illegal activities – bribe payments by firms to public officials as 
well as the share of income not reported for tax purposes by the firms. The information on bribe 
payments helps us understand the extent to which firms are victimized and the information on 
tax avoidance helps us explore the role of firms as perpetrators. We focus on the variables used 
to measure bribe payments and tax evasion in the following sub-section. 
                                                 
13 The ES surveys and their precursor, the World Business Environment Survey (WBES) have  been used to 
investigate a series of questions in developmental economics including the relation between property rights and 
contracting institutions (e.g. Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005),  investment climate and business environment obstacles 
to growth (e.g. Beck et al., 2005; Ayyagari et al., 2008), firm financing patterns (e.g. Beck et al., 2008; Cull and Xu, 
2005, Ayyagari et al., 2009) and dispute resolution via courts (e.g. Djankov et al., 2003). 11 
 
Second, the surveys have detailed information on the extent of innovation that the firms 
undertake. Previously, there has been very little consistent data across countries on the nature of 
innovative activities undertaken by firms. Moreover, the available data typically covers only the 
developed countries and focuses on patents and R&D expenditures where as new-to-firm 
innovation (e.g. new product introductions or use of new technologies) is of more relevance for 
our sample of developing countries where firms are less likely to develop globally new 
technologies. Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1993) also highlight the importance of new-to-firm 
innovation by arguing that innovators need government-supplied goods such as permits and 
licenses more than established producers and hence are particularly subject to public rent-
seeking.
14 To capture firm innovation we use a dummy variable, New Product Innovation, 
which takes the value 1 if the firm developed a new product line and 0 otherwise. While new 
product innovation is our main measure of innovation, as robustness we also use nine other 
indicators that capture firm innovation and dynamism in a broader sense - Upgraded an existing 
product line, Introduced new technology that has substantially changed the way that the main 
product is produced, Opened a new plant, Agreed to a new joint venture with a foreign partner, 
Obtained a new licensing agreement, Outsourced a major production activity that was 
previously conducted in-house, Brought in-house a major production activity that was previously 
outsourced, and two aggregate indicators, Core Innovation that captures introduction of a new 
product, upgraded an existing product line and introduced new technology and Dynamism Index 
which includes all of the individual innovation indicators above.  
We use three measures of external finance. Bank Financing is a dummy variable that 
takes the value 1 if the firm reported having a current bank loan or overdraft facility and 0 if the 
firm said it did not currently have access to a bank loan or overdraft facility. While there is no 
complementary variable defined for informal finance, the survey also asks firms to report the 
sources of financing for their new investments and working capital. Hence we construct 
                                                 
14 The ES surveys are unique in that they cover mainly developing economies and allow for a broader definition of 
innovation, to include not only core innovative activities such as the introduction of new products and new 
technologies, but also other types of activities that promote knowledge transfers such as signing joint ventures with 
foreign partners or obtaining new licensing agreements, and other actions that adapt the organization of the firm’s 
business activities such as opening a new plant or outsourcing a productive activity. The definition in the ES surveys 
aligns closely with that in the Oslo Manual that articulates the OECD/Eurostat definitions of innovation. See 
Schumpeter (1942), Segerstrom (1991), Grossman and Helpman (1991), Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti (2006), 
Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (forthcoming) for highlighting the importance of thinking about 
innovation broadly in developing countries. 12 
 
Informal Financing which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm reported that 
the sum of Family, Informal (e.g. moneylender), and Other financing of new investments or 
working capital is 50% or greater. Informal Financing takes the value 0 if the sum of family, 
informal and other financing of new investments and working capital is equal to 0 %. 
As a measure of firm performance we use the firm’s average Capacity Utilization which 
is defined as the amount of output actually produced relative to the maximum amount that could 
be produced with the firm’s existing machinery and equipment and regular shifts. As a check we 
also present results with Labor Productivity, which is the ratio of labor productivity of the firm 
to the mean labor productivity in its country where labor productivity is defined as (Total Sales-
Raw Material Costs)/Total Number of Workers in the previous year. Scaling by the country 
mean allows us to account for the wide heterogeneity in firm performances. Using a ratio also 
allows us to avoid dealing with exchange rate fluctuations in the time period. We also use Sales 
Growth over the past year as an alternate indicator of firm performance. We prefer capacity 
utilization as the main performance measure since labor productivity is a direct function of firm 
sales and hence may be mis-reported as well and we prefer capacity utilization to sales growth 
since the latter is available for a much smaller sample of firms. The ES surveys also contain 
detailed information on firm size, age, legal status, industry sector, and ownership, all of which 
are used as controls in our study. The survey defines firms of different sizes on the basis of the 
number of full time workers
15- small firms have less than 20 employees, medium firms employ 
20 to 99 employees, and large firms employ 100 or more employees. 
For a smaller sample of 27 transition countries, the ES surveys were implemented in 
2002 and 2005 as a joint initiative of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD) and the World Bank Group and are called the Business Environment and Enterprise 
Performance Surveys (BEEPS). The BEEPS surveys have more detailed data on profit margins 
and alternate measures of corruption and tax evasion, which we use as robustness checks in 
section 6. In addition, the BEEPS data contains a panel component, where 1,443 firms that were 
surveyed in 2002 were surveyed again in 2005. While we rely on the pooled 2002 and 2005 data 
for our main robustness checks we use the panel data for additional robustness checks to verify 
                                                 
15 Employment is typically the most reliable figure in developing countries. Hence, number of full time workers is 
used as a measure of firm size by the World Bank Group and other international survey teams including RPED and 
the Oxford Centre for the Study of African Economies. 13 
 
that the timing of the values of variables in our baseline econometric specifications does not 
affect our results. 
3.1  Bribes and Tax Evasion 
One of the concerns with self-reported measures on corruption and tax evasion is whether 
reliable data can be collected on illegal activity. However, Fisman and Svensson (2007) note that 
with appropriate data collection techniques, surveys
16 now have been able to elicit detailed 
information from firm managers on corruption. With theES surveys, given the sensitive nature of 
the data, government officials are not directly involved in data collection
17 nor are they given any 
raw data or any information that allows them to identify the responses of individual firms. Thus, 
firm names and their identities are confidential information. Furthermore, the surveys are 
conducted by the World Bank in partnership with the local private sector such as independent 
chambers of commerce or business associations that the local firms have confidence in. In 
addition, questions on bribes and tax evasion were phrased indirectly in the ES surveys. 
Consistent with established and approved survey methods, the firms were asked about the 
behavior of a typical firm rather than the firm itself, to avoid implicating the respondent firm 
with illegal activity. 
18 
Other established survey methods were also used to increase data accuracy. Corruption-
related questions were asked at the end of the interview when the interviewers had presumably 
established credibility and trust with the respondent and multiple questions were asked on bribe 
payments. In addition, we performed survey reliability tests by examining answers to the 
questions across two different points in time or across an equivalent set of firms. Specifically, for 
a smaller sub-sample of firms over 27 countries, we have additional variables on bribe payments 
                                                 
16 Fisman and Svensson (2007) rely on the Enterprise Survey for just one country, Uganda. 
17 The World Bank does coordinate with the national statistics agency where possible to obtain the sample frame and 
other information. 
18 Indirect questioning where subjects are asked about likely responses of a “typical subject” has been used 
extensively in other fields such as psychology, marketing, and criminology to counter social desirability bias where 
respondents over-report good behavior and underreport bad behavior. Fisher (1993) and Johansson-Stenman and 
Martinsson (2006) show that indirect questions elicit more honest responses to normative statements (those with 
social norms) than direct questions. Other studies show that indirect questioning yield a better reflection of what 
people actually did when they were not being scrutinized by an interviewer (e.g. Lusk and Norwood, 2009a, b) and 
that people’s predictions of others were a significantly more accurate predictor of actual future behavior than 
people’s statements about themselves (Epley and Dunning, 2000) 
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and tax evasion and responses from surveys implemented in 2002 and 2005. We find the 
responses to be highly correlated across the two years for the various variables. Similar data have 
been used by several papers including Svensson (2005) and Fisman and Svensson (2007). 
Hallward-Driemeier and Aterido (2009) examine how well firm responses in the ES surveys on 
questions related to obstacles in the business environment correspond to other data sources and 
find a high degree of correlation between firm responses and measured objective outcomes from 
external data sources. 
The use of self-reported measures to study criminal behavior is very common in 
criminology. Several researchers (e.g. Chaiken and Chaiken 1982; Mande and English 1987; 
Homey and Marshall 1991) have shown that self-reports used to estimate the prevalence and 
frequency of offending among incarcerated adults provide more detailed data than do police and 
court records and cross- validation of these self-reports with formal records indicates a 
reasonable degree of validity in the responses of adult inmates (Marquis with Ebener 1981). 
Junger-Tas and Marshall (1999) report that despite problems related to sampling and 
international data collection methods, the reliability and validity of data from self-report surveys 
are higher than for police data collected within each particular country.  
All of the above give us confidence that the ES surveys are an important first step in 
understanding firm’s illegal activities. As a measure of bribe payments we construct the variable, 
Bribes, which are firm responses to the question – “What percent of annual sales value does a 
typical firm like yours spend on gifts or informal payments to public officials to “get things done” 
with regard to customs, taxes, licenses, regulations, services etc?”
19  The variable, Tax Evasion, 
is constructed from firm responses to the following question – “Recognizing the difficulties many 
enterprises face in fully complying with taxes and regulations, what percentage of total sales 
would you estimate the typical establishment in your area of activity reports for tax purposes?”
20  
                                                 
19 While this is a general variable proxying for the extent of corruption in the economy, in separate questions, the 
survey also asks firms to report on bribes paid to specific government agencies (tax inspectorate, labor and social 
security, fire and building safety, sanitation, police, and environmental). All our results exploring the link between 
corruption and tax evasion are robust to using these alternate measures to examine a sample of firms that report 
paying bribes in general but not to tax officials. 
20 Since informal firms often misreport taxes, an existing economics literature on informality uses this variable as a 
measure of the extent of informal or unofficial activity in the economy (e.g Friedman et al., 2000; Dabla-Norris et al., 
2008; Gatti and Honoratti, 2008; La Porta and Shleifer, 2008), However, since our sample consists entirely of 15 
 
Since this variable is not adjusted for corporate tax rates, it provides an upper bound of tax 
evasion. The survey has no information on the marginal tax rates for each firm that would enable 
us to quantify the true tax burden of each firm and the magnitude of evasion. As an alternative, 
we adjust the tax evasion measure using statutory corporate tax rates and 1-year effective 
corporate tax rates from Djankov, Ganser, McLiesh, Ramalho, and Shleifer (2008). We don’t 
rely only on the tax adjusted measures since the data on corporate tax rates is available for only 
47 countries in our sample.
21  
To capture the net burden of corruption on firms, we construct the variable Firm Type 
which takes on four values: Abiders if the firm reports paying no bribes and evading no taxes, 
i.e. they abide by the law; Perpetrators if the firm reports paying no bribes but does report 
evading taxes; Victims if the firm reports paying bribes but not evading taxes; and Retaliators if 
the firm reports paying bribes and evading taxes. 
3.2 Empirical  Methodology 
In this section we proceed in the following steps to answering the empirical questions in section 
2. First we examine what types of firms pay bribes, focusing in particular on innovating firms. 
For firm i in industry j in country k, we run the following regression: 
Bribesi,j,k  =  + 1 Innovatorsi,j,k  + 2 Firm Size dummiesi,j,k + 3 Agei,j,k + 4 Legal Status 
dummiesi,j,k  + 5 Family Owned dummyi,j,k + 6 Capacity Utilizationi,j,k + 7Foreign Ownership 
dummyi,j,k +  8 Exporter dummyi,j,k + 9Ij + 10 Ck + 11 Year Dummies + ei,j,k,  
k=1,....,57; j=1,...,5  (1) 
where Ij and Ck are industry and country fixed effects respectively. We instrument for innovators 
using education level of the workforce since Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic 
(forthcoming) have shown that innovation is closely educated with a more educated workforce 
and manager. 
                                                                                                                                                             
registered firms operating in the formal economy, with no firms in the unregistered sector in our sample “percentage 
of income not reported for tax purposes” measures tax evasion rather than informality.  
21 Note that tax evasion is used as a dependent variable in our analysis so there should be no concerns about 
measurement error related endogeneity biases in our analysis. 16 
 
Next, we look at the association between Bribes and Tax Evasion by estimating the 
following regression: 
Tax Evasioni,j,k  =  + 1 Bribesi,j,k  + 2 Firm Size dummiesi,j,k + 3 Agei,j,k + 4 Legal Status 
dummiesi,j,k  + 5 Family Owned dummyi,j,k + 6 Capacity Utilizationi,j,k + 7 Foreign Ownership 
dummyi,j,k +  8 Exporter dummyi,j,k + 9 Ij + 10 Ck + 11 Year Dummies + ei,j,k,  
k=1,....,57; j=1,...,5  (2) 
To analyze the causal relation between bribes and tax evasion we use instrumental variables, 
instrumenting bribes with the time spent by the firm’s management in interacting with 
government officials (other than those in the tax inspectorate).  
We next examine the burden of corruption on firms by looking at the distribution of firms 
as victims or perpetrators across countries. In particular we look at the effect of financing on the 
distribution of firms as victims or perpetrators by estimating the following regressions. 
Abiders/Perpetrators/Victims/Retaliatorsi,j,k  =  + 1 Innovatorsi,j,k  + 2 Financing + 3 Firm 
Size dummiesi,j,k + 4 Agei,j,k + 5 Legal Status dummiesi,j,k  + 6 Family Owned dummyi,j,k + 
7Capacity Utilizationi,j,k + 8Foreign Ownership dummyi,j,k +  9 Exporter dummyi,j,k + 10Ij + 
11 Ck + 12 Year Dummies + ei,j,k   k=1,....,57; j=1,...,5  (3) 
Our data consists of pooled cross-sections over time since some of the countries are 
surveyed in multiple years but during each year a new random sample is taken from the 
population. As suggested by Wooldridge (2002, page 129), we use the pooled ordinary least 
squares estimator with country, industry and year fixed effects to account for aggregate changes 
over time to analyze the pooled cross-section data in (1) and (2).  In (3), the dependent variable is 
one of the four firm type variables - Abiders, Perpetrators, Victims, and Retaliators - and we use 
a logit specification with country, industry, and year fixed effects for our estimations. At each 
step we perform several robustness checks to test that our results are robust to different 
estimation techniques and samples.  17 
 
4. Summary  Statistics   
4.1  Incidence of Bribes and Tax Evasion around the World 
Given the lack of firm-level evidence on corruption and tax evasion, in this section, we first 
present detailed statistics at the firm level across countries on bribe payments and tax avoidance. 
We then discuss summary statistics. 
Table 1 reports averages of Bribes and Tax Evasion and the distribution of firms as 
Abiders, Perpetrators, Victims, and Retaliators across different country classifications and 
different firm categories.
22 In the discussion below, we first focus on the incidence of bribes and 
tax evasion and then on the distribution of firm types. Panel A presents statistics across different 
regions. Col. 2 of Panel A shows that the average bribe payments are low across all countries 
ranging from 1.22% of revenue in Europe and Central Asia to 3.63% of revenue in Middle East 
and North Africa. The tax evasion numbers present an upper bound of tax evasion in each region 
since they are unadjusted for tax rates and show that tax evasion is highest in East Asia Pacific 
(29.42%) and lowest in Europe and Central Asia (14.70%).
23 In each region the amount of 
underreported revenue exceeds the proportion of revenue paid out as bribes. 
In unreported results across country income categories, we find that the average bribe 
payments range from 0.3% in OECD countries to 2.3% in low income countries. The bribe 
payments are statistically different from zero and also between income categories. Note that our 
sample is dominated by developing countries so we only have seven high income countries of 
which six are OECD countries. Reported tax evasion is similarly lowest in OECD countries 
(7.1%) and highest in the low income countries (24.5%).
24   
As a validity check of the survey data on bribe payments, in unreported comparisons, we 
compared our results to two widely used country-level indices, Transparency International’s (TI) 
                                                 
22 In panels A-B, the numbers are first averaged across countries and then across different country classification. In 
panels C-H, the numbers are averaged across firms in each firm classification. 
23 Both bribes and tax evasion are lower in South Asia – 0.19% and 7.40% respectively but we only have data for Sri 
Lanka in South Asia. 
24 We also computed tax adjusted measures of tax avoidance, multiplying the tax evasion measure by the country’s 
statutory and effective corporate tax rates from Djankov et al. (2009) respectively. We find similar results when we 
use 5-year effective corporate tax rates from Djankov et al. (2009) instead of 1-year effective corporate tax rates. 
Both the statutory and effective tax adjusted measures show that tax evasion is the highest in low income countries 
(5.49% and 3.42% respectively) and the least in high income countries (2.18% and 1.28% respectively). A t-test 
shows the magnitudes of the tax evasion measures to be statistically different across income group categories. 18 
 
Corruption Perception Index and the World Bank’s Control of Corruption Index described in 
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2007). We find that both the cross-country measures show 
similar patterns as our data. The TI measure relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as 
seen by business people and country analysts and ranges between 0 (highly corrupt) and 10 
(highly clean). In our sample, the TI measure ranges from 6.21 in high income countries to 2.50 
in low income countries. The World Bank’s Control of Corruption Index measures the degree to 
which corruption is perceived to exist among businesses, public officials and politicians and 
ranges from -2.5 (highly corrupt) to +2.5 (non-corrupt). Specifically it is meant to “capture the 
extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms 
of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests.” In our sample of 
countries, the Control of Corruption Index ranges from 1.13 in high income countries to -0.72 in 
low income countries. Thus we see that the reported bribe payments by firms vary across 
countries in a similar fashion as other cross-country indicators do. Corresponding cross-country 
indicators of Tax Evasion are not available for comparison purposes. 
When we look at the distribution of firm types across different regions, we find that 
Abiders make up the largest fraction of firm types in each region. The highest percentages of 
Perpetrators are found in South Asia where as the largest percentage of firms that pay bribes to 
public officials but do not evade taxes, the firms that we refer to as Victims, are found in East 
Asia Pacific. Interestingly the pattern of Retaliators somewhat resembles that of the Victims. 
Similar to that of the Victims, the largest percentage of Retaliators are found in East Asia Pacific. 
In Panel B, we report summary statistics depending on the level of bureaucratic 
regulation in the economy. Following De Soto (1990) and Djankov et al. (2002), we use entry 
regulation to capture the extent of bureaucratic regulation in an economy. Specifically, we use 
the Number of procedures required to start a business averaged over 2004-2005 from the World 
Bank Doing Business Indicators, which in our sample of countries ranges from 4 (Ireland) to 18 
(Uganda) with a median value of 10.7. We classify countries into high and low regulation 
depending on whether the number of procedures required to start a business in that country lies 
above or below the median value respectively. We find that the level of bribe payments and tax 
evasion is higher in the high regulation countries. When we look at firm types, we find that the 
the high regulation countries have a higher percentage of retaliators and lower percentage of 19 
 
Abiders than low regulation countries. They also have higher percentages of Perpetrators and 
Victims though these are not significantly different from those in low regulation countries. 
In Panels B-G of Table 1, we show the average bribe payments, tax evasion, and firm 
types across different types of firms. Small firms report the highest bribe payments (1.50%) and 
tax evasion (18.03%) compared to medium (1.46% and 16.92% respectively) and large firms 
(1.03% and 14.70% respectively). Domestic firms report significantly higher bribe payments 
(1.39%) and tax evasion (17.52%) than foreign firms (1.30% and 12.87% respectively). 
Similarly, non-exporters report significantly higher bribe payments (1.43%) and tax evasion 
(17.13%) than exporting firms (1.17% and 16.09% respectively). Firms in the agro-industry 
report the highest bribe payments (2.35%) and tax evasion (32.33%) compared to manufacturing, 
services, construction or other sectors. Next is the manufacturing sector within which the highest 
average bribe payments is in the electronics industry and highest average tax evasion is in auto 
and auto components followed by electronics. Across legal status, average reported bribes are 
highest among the cooperatives (1.95%) followed by sole proprietorships (1.51%) and 
partnerships (1.34%). Corporations report the lowest average bribes (1.23%) after Other Legal 
structures (1.16%). Average tax evasion is also highest among Cooperatives. While Corporations 
have higher average tax evasion than partnerships, a closer look at the numbers reveals that it is 
the privately held, limited companies which have higher average tax evasion than partnerships 
while the publicly listed companies have lower average tax evasion.  
To summarize, we find that the level of bribes and tax evasion is higher for firms that are 
small, unincorporated, domestic, non-exporting firms and in countries with high levels of 
bureaucratic regulation. 
When we look at the distribution of firm types, as in the case of countries, the largest 
percentage in any category are the Abiders who report paying no bribes and evading no taxes. 
Within the small firms’ size class, a larger proportion of firms are Perpetrators (26.9%) 
compared to Victims (11.6%) and Retaliators (23.8%). Medium Size firms have more Retaliators 
(24.3%) compared to Perpetrators (19.4%) or Victims (15.9%). Amongst the large firms, 15.8% 
are Perpetrators, 18.3% are Victims and 17.5% are Retaliators. Across the size classes we find 20 
 
that the percentage of Perpetrators is highest among small firms, Victims is highest among the 
large firms and Retaliators is highest among the medium firms. 
Across firm ownership categories, 23.35% of domestic firms are Perpetrators compared 
to 13.2% of foreign firms, 14% of domestic firms are Victims compared to 19% of foreign firms 
and 22.7% of domestic firms are Retaliators compared to 20.5% of foreign firms. When we look 
at exporting status in panel K, we find a larger proportion of Perpetrators and Retaliators among 
non-exporters (23% in both cases) compared to exporters (19% and 19.9% respectively) and a 
smaller proportion of Victims among non-exporters (13.8%) compared to exporters (16.6%). 
Across industries, we find that the percentage of Perpetrators is highest in Agro Industry 
(28.1%) followed by Manufacturing (23.6%), Services (20.5%), Construction (18.6%) and 
Others (15.2%). By contrast, the percentage of Victims is the smallest in the Agro industry (7.6%) 
and highest in the Other Industry sectors (21.9%). Percentage of Retaliators are also highest in 
Agro Industry (33%) followed by Construction (28%), Services (23.1%), Manufacturing (20.9%) 
and Other (16%). 
In panel F, we find that the largest percentage of Perpetrators is among Sole 
Proprietorships which also have the lowest percentage of Victims across different legal status 
categories. The largest percentage of Victims is among Partnerships and the largest percentage of 
Retaliators is among Cooperatives. 
Panel A of Table 2 reports the summary statistics for the variables and Panel B shows the 
correlation matrix between the main variables of interest. Panel A shows that the mean bribe 
payments in the sample are only 1.34% where as mean tax evasion is 17.10%. Thus in economic 
terms, tax evasion seems to have a higher prevalence across countries than bribe payments to 
government officials. However note that these provide only an upper bound for tax evasion since 
they are unadjusted for corporate tax rates. When we adjust it according to the statutory 
corporate tax rates, the mean tax evasion is only 4.42%. When we look at the breakdown of firm 
types, we find that 41% of the sample report paying no bribes and evading no taxes (Abiders), 22% 
are Perpetrators in that they do not pay bribes but evade taxes, 14% are Victims in that they pay 
bribes but do not evade taxes and 22% of the sample are Retaliators in the sense that they pay 
bribes as well as evade taxes.   21 
 
Table 2 shows that the percentage of firms with bank financing is 49% in the sample and 
the percentage of firms who finance 50% or more of their new investments or working capital 
with funds from family, informal or other sources is 14%. A large number of firms in our sample 
(37%) are innovators in that they introduced or developed a new product line. The mean capacity 
utilization is 78.8%.  
The sample is largely dominated by small and medium sized firms - small firms make up 
44% of the sample, medium firms constitute 32%, and large firms constitute 24% of the overall 
sample. In terms of legal status, 39% of the sample is composed of corporations, 32% are sole 
proprietorships, 21% are partnerships, 2% are cooperatives and 6% are other legal structures. 
The average firm age in the sample is 15.62 years. Panel A also shows that 13% of the sample of 
firms is composed of foreign firms and 21% of the firms are exporters. 
The correlation matrix in Panel B shows that the correlation coefficient between tax 
evasion and bribes is 0.14 and is highly significant at the 1% level. Bribes are significantly 
positively associated with greater use of informal financing and negatively associated with both 
the bank financing and bank access. Tax Evasion shows similar patterns – it is positively 
associated with informal financing and negatively associated with bank financing and bank 
access. The financing variables are significantly correlated with each other at the 1% level.  
5. Results 
5.1  Are Bribe Payments a Tax on Innovation? 
In this section, we investigate how innovating firms are particularly affected by bribe payments. 
If  bribe payments are a tax on innovation we should expect to see that innovating firms have to 
give a higher percentage of their sales as gifts or informal payments to public officials (after 
controlling for general firm characteristics). Table 3 shows the relation between innovation and 
bribe payments using different controls for firm performance and across different samples. In all 
specifications, we drop firms reporting greater than 50% state ownership.  
Cols. 1 and 2 of Table 3 present results for the full sample of firms, with and without 
controls for capacity utilization. In both instances we find that innovating firms on average pay 
0.37% more of their sales as bribes to public officials than non-innovators. Note that the average 22 
 
bribe payment in the full sample of firms is 1.43% of the sales revenue.
 Col. 2 shows a negative 
association between capacity utilization and bribe payments. So assuming that the bribes are 
fixed relative to a firm’s capacity, this implies that bribes are a lower proportion of their overall 
costs for firms operating efficiently.
25 
The positive association between innovation and bribe payments holds when we include 
additional controls for firm performance using different proxies –labor productivity ratio and 
sales growth – as in cols. 3 and 4. The results in the specification with sales growth are stronger 
– innovating firms pay 0.58% more of their sales as bribes – but the number of observations is 
down to 7470 firms in 31 countries. In unreported results, we find similar results when we 
replace past year sales growth with sales growth over the past two years or sales growth lagged 
by one year. In unreported specifications where we control for profit reinvestment rates, we 
again find that innovation is positively associated with bribe payments where as there is no 
significant association between profit reinvestment rates and bribes.  Thus, we find that while 
firm performance by itself is negatively associated with bribe payments, innovating firms in 
particular report having to pay higher bribes. In subsequent specifications, we rely on capacity 
utilization as our main performance measure.  
Smaller and younger firms report paying a larger percentage of their sales as bribe 
payments. Individual or family owned firms pay higher bribes than if the firm was owned by 
another corporation, bank, investment fund, manager / employees of the firm or the state. Across 
industry sectors, we find that firms in the construction industry pay higher bribes than firms in 
the manufacturing industry. We find no variation in bribe payments across legal organization of 
the firm, domestic versus foreign ownership and whether the firm is an exporter or not. 
In col. 5 we repeat the specification in col. 2 for a sample of only small firms. We find 
that small innovating firms pay a larger fraction of their sales as bribe payments than small non-
innovators suggesting that small innovating firms may be particularly victimized. Col. 6 restricts 
the sample to manufacturing firms only and again we find a strong association between 
innovation and bribe payments. In col. 7 we drop agro industry firms since the summary 
statistics in Table 2 show that agro industry firms have the highest bribe payments. We continue 
                                                 
25 If we re-run the specification in column 2 for firms that opened a new plant and those that did not, we find 
capacity utilization to be negatively associated with bribes only for firms that did not open new plants. 23 
 
to find a strong association between innovation and bribe payments. Our survey also has data on 
the bribes paid to different government agencies. Since one of the questions we focus on later in 
the paper is the link between different forms of illegal activity, in particular bribe payments and 
tax evasion, in col. 8 we restrict the sample to firms that report paying bribes to public officials 
but specifically not to the tax authorities. Even for this sample of firms we find that innovators 
pay more bribes in general to public officials than non-innovators.
26 
Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (forthcoming) have shown that education of 
the workforce and the top manager in the company are associated with the innovation. Hence, in 
col. 9, we instrument for innovation using the percentage of workforce that have more than 12 
years of education (university of higher).
27  The first stage F-stat is 158.93 (>>10) indicating that 
the instrument is strong. This is further supported by the weak instrument robust inference tests 
such as the Anderson-Rubin Wald test where the null hypothesis that the coefficient of 
workforce education in the first stage regression is 0, is rejected.  
In col. 10, we investigate if innovators are subject to bribe payments to private parties 
other than the government. Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1993) differentiate between public 
rent-seeking (e.g. bribe payments to government officials) and private rent-seeking (e.g. 
payments to private parties including theft, payments to mafia, etc) and argue that innovators are 
particularly subject to public rent-seeking since they are more in need of government-supplied 
services than established firms.  To explore this, we regress Protection Payments, which is % of 
total sales that is used for protection payments to private parties (e.g. mafia) on innovation and 
find no association between innovation and private payments. Consistent with Murphy, Shleifer, 
and Vishny’s prediction, we do not find that innovators pay higher protection payments to 
private parties. 
We conduct several robustness tests of our results. In Appendix A, we re-estimate the 
specification in col. 2 of Table 5 with a broader definition of innovation. Most firms in emerging 
                                                 
26 All our results are robust to choice of estimator. When we use logit regressions where the dependent variable is a 
dummy variable that takes value 1 if firm reported paying bribes and 0 otherwise, we find that the odds of having to 
pay bribes are 1.36 times higher for innovators than non innovators. We do not use this for our main specification 
since we would lose the variation in percentage of bribe payments by dichotomizing the bribe payments variable. 
We also find our results unchanged when we use a two-limit tobit model. Being an innovator increases the 
probability that the firm pays bribes as well as the percentage of bribe payments conditional on paying bribes. 
27 We obtain similar results if we were to use education level of the top manager as an instrument. 24 
 
markets are engaged in activities far from the technological frontier and entrepreneurs innovate 
not just through original inventions but also by adopting new means of production, new products 
and new forms of organization. Hence, we define the innovation process broadly by using firm 
responses to the survey questions on whether the firms had undertaken any of the following 
innovative activities in the last three years: Upgraded an existing product line, Introduced new 
technology that has substantially changed the way that the main product is produced, Opened a 
new plant, Agreed to a new joint venture with a foreign partner, Obtained a new licensing 
agreement, Outsourced a major production activity that was previously conducted in-house, and 
Brought in-house a major production activity that was previously outsourced. The firm 
responses are coded as 0-1 (No-Yes) dummy variables for each of the questions. We construct 
two aggregate indices of innovation from the individual indicators – Aggregate Innovation Index 
is an aggregate index obtained by summing firm responses to all the eight innovative activities in 
which the firm engages and Core Innovation is an aggregate index obtained by summing firm 
responses to two activities, Developed a major new product line and Introduced new technology 
that has substantially changed the way that the main product is produced. 
Appendix A shows that most other forms of innovation such as upgrading a product line, 
introducing new technology, signing new joint ventures, and new licensing agreements are 
associated with higher bribe payments. Core Innovation and the Aggregate Innovation Index are 
also positively and significantly (at the 1% level) associated with bribe payments. Very few 
firms in our sample engage in opening plants and changing sourcing decisions and we find that 
those activities are not associated with significantly higher bribe payments. Replacing the linear 
specification with a logit specification using a dummy variable for bribes paid as the dependent 
variable, we find all types of innovation including opening new plant and sourcing decisions to 
be significantly associated with higher probability of bribe payments. 
Overall, we find strong evidence that bribe payments to government officials are tied to 
innovative projects confirming that innovating firms are taxed for their innovation. These firms 
pay off government officials across various departments to be able to get things done and 
innovate. We also have evidence that smaller firms pay more when they innovate than larger 
firms.  25 
 
5.1.1  Innovators and Their Interactions with Government 
In this section, we investigate the interactions between innovating firms and government officials 
to get a better understanding of whether innovators are victimized by corruption or if they obtain 
special concessions from government officials. Our surveys provide detailed information on the 
service interruptions experienced by firms, the delays in obtaining different licenses required for 
operation of their business and the time spent dealing with bureaucracy. 
In Panel A of Table 4, we examine the mean number of days that firms experience 
service interruptions due to power outages, insufficient water supply, unavailable telephone 
service and transport failures. We present a test of means between innovators who pay bribes and 
innovators who don’t pay bribes. Cols. 1 and 2 of panel A show that innovating firms that pay 
bribes on average lose 17.1, 10.5, and 5.43 days respectively due to power outages, insufficient 
water supply and unavailable telephone service which are all significantly larger than the 11.2, 
6.2, and 2.6 days respectively lost by innovators that don’t pay bribes.  
The survey also has information on the delay experienced in obtaining a telephone line, 
electricity connection, water connection, construction permit, import license, and operating 
license from the day the firm applied for the license to when they received the approval/service. 
When we look at innovators that bribe versus those that don’t, we find that innovators that pay 
bribes experience significantly longer delays in obtaining telephone connections, electrical 
connections, construction permits, import licenses and operating licenses than innovators that 
don’t pay bribes. One caveat though is that the sample sizes for firms reporting data on water 
connections, construction permits, import and operating licenses is less than 500. Note that while 
these results suggest that innovating firms that pay bribes are not benefitting through reduced 
service interruptions, and may be extorted by actual service interruptions, we are cautious in our 
interpretations since we do not have information on the timing of the bribe payments relative to 
that of the service interruptions. 
 In Panel C, we look at the average number of days innovators spend in inspections and 
mandatory meetings with officials of different government agencies in the context of regulation 
of their business. We find that innovators that pay bribes spend significantly more time dealing 
with officials from all agencies expect in the case of fire and building safety and environmental 26 
 
agencies where the differences are not significant. In regressions of each of these variables on the 
interactions of bribe payments and innovation, we find no evidence that bribe payments offer 
innovators any special advantages either in obtaining better services or in reducing the time spent 
dealing with specific government agencies. While we don’t present these results due to 
endogeneity concerns associated with including both service interruptions and bribes in the same 
equation, the findings provide further suggestive evidence that the type of corruption we analyze 
serves as a tax on innovation rather than benefiting the firms in any specific way. 
5.2  Bribe Payments and Tax Evasion 
In this section we examine the link between bribe payments and tax evasion. In col. 1 of Table 5, 
we regress tax evasion on bribes and find that the larger the percentage of sales paid out as bribes 
to public officials, the larger is the underreporting of revenue to tax authorities. A 1% increase in 
bribe payments to public officials results in a 0.53% increase in tax evasion. We find similar 
results when we replace Bribes with a dummy variable in col. 2. Firms that pay bribes 
underreport their revenue on average by 6.13% more than firms that do not pay bribes. Therefore, 
both the probability of paying bribes and the amount of bribes paid are significantly associated 
with tax evasion. 
Larger firms, older firms, firms with higher capacity utilization, and foreign owned firms 
evade taxes less. Partnerships evade taxes less than sole proprietorships. The corporations 
dummy is not significantly different from sole proprietorships. We also find that family owned 
firms evade more though the coefficient is not significant in the first two cols. of Table 5.  
Across industry sectors, we find that only firms in the Other Sector, which consists 
predominantly of firms in mining and quarrying industries, evade significantly less taxes than 
those in Manufacturing. 
One of the concerns with using a general bribes variable is that our results on tax evasion 
may be being driven by firms that bribe tax authorities. Hence in col. 3 of Table 5, we drop firms 
that report bribing tax authorities. Since detailed breakdown of the types of bribes paid is not 
available for many firms, sample size is reduced from 25,426 to 17,938. Even with this smaller 27 
 
sample, we find that bribes to public officials (excluding those to the tax inspectorate) are 
significantly associated with increased tax evasion. 
28 
In Col. 4 we examine if there is a causal link between bribes and tax evasion by 
instrumenting bribe payments with the interactions with government officials. Specifically, the 
instrument is the percentage of senior management’s time in a typical week that is spent dealing 
with requirements imposed by government regulations including dealing with officials, 
completing forms, etc. In estimating the regression, we explicitly drop firms who report spending 
any days in inspections and mandatory meetings with officials of the tax inspectorate. Thus we 
expect the instrument to be correlated with bribe payments (the endogenous regressor), but 
uncorrelated with tax evasion (the outcome variable) for reasons beyond its effect on the 
endogenous regressor.  It could be that firms that spend more time with government officials and 
bribe them are doing so for personal gain and hence also evade taxes since they are particularly 
prone to illegal behavior. However we find our results to hold even when we drop firms that 
report bribing the tax authorities. The instrumental variable regressions results in col. 4 show that 
for the sub-population of firms whose bribe paying behavior is influenced by their interactions 
with government officials other than those in the tax inspectorate, we find bribes to be 
significantly causally associated with tax evasion.  The first stage F-stats reported in the table 
reject the hypothesis that the time spent with government officials is a weak instrument for bribe 
payments. However, just in case, we use the LIML estimator in the IV regression which is most 
robust to the weak instrument case. In addition our instrument pass a battery of tests of 
instruments. The Anderson-Rubin statistic tests the null hypothesis that the coefficient of the 
endogenous regressor in the main equation is 0 and is rejected as shown in col. 4.  
5.2.1  Innovation and Tax Evasion 
In section 2, while we predict innovating firms to be particular targets for bribery and indeed find 
an empirical association between innovation and bribes above, we don’t expect there to be an 
                                                 
28 All our results are robust to choice of estimator. We get a significant and strong association between bribes and 
tax evasion using Logit regressions where the dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if firm 
reported taxes and 0 otherwise as well as two-limit Tobit regressions to account for Tax Evasion taking on zero 
values with positive probability and being a continuous random variable over strictly positive values. As an 
alternative to tobit, we use a two stage hurdle model (Cameron and Trivedi (1998), Mullahy (1986)) and find that 
the level of bribe payments is associated with both the probability and extent of tax evasion. 28 
 
association between innovation and tax evasion. In a rational economic model, there is no reason 
why innovating firms would evade more or less taxes. To investigate this further, we examine 
the association between innovation and tax evasion in Table 6. In col. 1, we find innovation to be 
weakly associated with tax evasion at the 10% level. However this result is very weak and 
disappears when we include bribes as a control variable in col.2 and/or drop firms that report 
bribing tax authorities as shown in cols. 3 and 4. This suggests that the only significant effect of 
innovation on tax evasion is through the bribes variable. In other words, innovating firms that 
pay more bribes also evade more taxes. 
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5.3  Distribution of Firms as Victims vs. Perpetrators: Role of Finance 
In addition to firms whose tax reporting is directly affected by bribe paying, examined in the 
previous section, there are firms who may underreport taxes independently of their bribe paying 
(who we call Perpetrators), and other firms which pay bribes and do not underreport income 
(who we call Victims). We next examine whether innovation and bank financing predict which 
of these categories the firms fall into and the net gains from bribery and tax evasion.   
Cols. 1 to 4 of Panel A in Table 7 show that controlling for country fixed effects and 
various firm characteristics, innovating firms are more likely to be Victims or Retaliators and 
less likely to be Abiders and Perpetrators. Thus, being an innovator is not associated with a 
higher probability of avoiding taxes in the absence of corruption by government officials. 
In Panel B of Table 7, we look at the effect of financing in addition to innovation. Cols. 1 
to 4 of Panel B show that innovating firms and those dependent on Bank Financing are more 
likely to be Victims or Retaliators. There is no evidence that innovating firms or those that are 
bank financed are significantly associated with being Perpetrators. Since the number of 
observations in this model is reduced to 7400 due to the availability of the bank finance variable, 
in cols 5 to 8, we replace the bank financing variable with a firm’s dependence on informal 
financing. It may be noted that Informal Financing is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if 
the firm reported that the sum of Family, Informal (e.g. moneylender), and Other financing of 
new investments or working capital is 50% or greater. Informal Financing takes the value 0 if the 
                                                 
29 Since we do not find an association between innovation and tax evasion, we do not report IV specifications 
exploring causality.  29 
 
sum of family, informal and other financing of new investments and working capital is equal to 
0 %. Interestingly while innovators are more likely to be Victims as before, we find that 
informally financed firms, that is firms whose financing of new investments is sourced 50% or 
more from informal, family, and other sources are more likely to be Perpetrators.  
As robustness, in Appendix B, we replicate the above results using multinomial 
regressions. Since we are primarily interested in the classification of firms as Victims and 
Perpetrators, the omitted category in all our specifications is Abiders and Retaliators.  
Multinomial logit specifications require strong assumptions about the independence of the four 
categories (Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives) which may not hold for the entire sample of 
firms and hence we only present these results in the Appendix. 
The results from the multinomial logits confirm the proportions in Table 7. We find that 
in our sample, innovating firms are more likely to be Victims. There is no evidence that 
innovating firms are Perpetrators. Thus, being an innovator is not associated with a higher 
probability of avoiding taxes in the absence of corruption by government officials.
30 
In Panel B we look at the effect of financing in addition to innovation. Models 1 and 2 of 
Panel B shows that innovating firms and those dependent on bank financing are more likely to be 
Victims where as informally financed firms are more likely to be Perpetrators. When we restrict 
the sample to low and lower-middle income countries in Model 3, we again find that informal 
financing is associated with being Perpetrators. 
                                                 
30 Our regression results are also borne out by sample summary statistics. A two sample test of proportions shows 
that the proportions of Victims among innovating firms (16.36%) is significantly higher than the proportion of 
Victims among non-innovators (13.36%) at the 1% level and the proportions of Perpetrators among innovating firms 
(19.32%) is significantly lower than that among non-innovators (23.13%). The proportion of Abiders s is lower 
among innovators (41.31%) compared to non-innovators (42.81%) where as the proportion of Retaliators is higher 
among innovators (23.01%) compared to non-innovators (20.70%). In addition, we find that the proportions of 
Perpetrators and Retaliators among informally financed firms (25.36% and 28.71% respectively) is significantly 
higher than the corresponding proportions of Perpetrators and Retaliators among firms that are not informally 
financed (21.13% and 20.57% respectively). In contrast, the proportion of Abiders and Victims among informally 
financed firms (31.86% and 14.08% respectively) is smaller than the proportions of Abiders and Victims among 
firms that are not informally financed (43.71% and 14.58% respectively) though only the difference in proportions 
of Abiders is significantly different at the 1% level where as that of Victims is not. 30 
 
Overall, the results from Table 7 and Appendix B show that, informal financing is 
associated with greater tax evasion, especially so in low and lower middle income countries. By 
contrast, bank financed firms are subject to more scrutiny and thus are less likely to evade taxes.  
It must be noted though that we are unable to fully address endogeneity concerns. We can 
make partial progress, so that, for example, if we were to instrument for just Innovator in panel A 
using time spent with government officials other than those in the tax inspectorate, we find 
significant results that Innovators are more likely to be Victims and Retaliators and less likely to 
be Abiders and Perpetrators.  However, the complexity of the relations between the multiple 
endogenous variables – innovation and financing and the categorical dependent variable makes it 
tough to find multiple instruments at the firm-level in our survey data that affect innovation and 
financing but not firm participation in illegal behavior. Hence we leave the identification issues 
in this area for future work. 
6. Robustness   
6.1  Bribe Payments and Tax Evasion - Robustness Checks using BEEPS 
In this section we perform robustness checks of our main results using the BEEPS surveys that 
surveyed 27 transition countries across Europe and Central Asia in 2005. The data from the 
smaller sub-sample of countries have the following additional features that make it very 
attractive for robustness checks: First, as noted earlier, we have data on profit margins for about 
6700 firms, where profit margin is defined as the margin by which sales price exceeds operating 
costs. We also have a dummy variable indicating whether or not the firm was profitable in 2003.  
Second, in developing countries, firms may try to evade taxes in other ways other than 
under-reporting income. In addition to the raw measure of tax evasion that is used in the previous 
tables, we have information on Tax Evasion (Wagebill) and Tax Evasion (Labor). Tax 
Evasion (Wagebill) is constructed as 100 - firm responses to the survey question “Recognizing 
the difficulties that many firms face in fully complying with labor regulations, what percentage 
of the actual wage bill would you estimate the typical firm in your area of business reports for 
tax purposes?” Tax Evasion (Labor) is constructed as 100 - firm responses to the survey question 
“Recognizing the difficulties that many firms face in fully complying with labor regulations, 31 
 
what percentage of total workforce would you estimate the typical firm in your area of business 
reports for tax purposes?”  
In Table 8, we perform additional robustness tests of our regressions in Table 3 using the 
two new dependent variables. In addition to the usual set of control variables we also control for 
Profit Margin in cols. 1, 3, 5, and 7 and for Profitability Dummy in cols. 2, 4, 6, and 8. 
Specifically, in the OLS regressions in cols. 1-4, we regress the different measures of Tax 
Evasion on bribes paid to public officials. The results show that greater the bribes paid to public 
officials, firms under report their wage bill and labor for tax purposes. In cols. 5-8, we report 
instrumental variable specifications where we instrument for bribes using time spent with the 
government.  Specifically, time spent with the government is the percent of senior management’s 
time over the last 12 months that was spent in dealing with public officials about the application 
and interpretation of laws and regulations and to get or to maintain access to public services? The 
IV regressions show that but for one specification in col. 7 where we control for profit margin in 
the Tax Evasion (Labor) regression, bribe payments influence the extent of tax evasion. The 
firms whose bribe paying behavior is altered by the time their managers spend dealing with 
public officials evade more taxes by reporting a lower wage bill and lower total workforce. 
31 
6.2  Are Bribe Payments a Tax on Innovation? Robustness Checks 
In this section, we undertake several robustness checks to confirm that innovative firms are 
indeed victimized by corruption. In unreported regressions, we perform the following robustness 
tests:  First when we re-estimate our regressions controlling for profit margin in the BEEPS 
sample, we find that profit margin is not significant and innovating firms still pay more bribes 
than non-innovators. For the same set of countries, we have surveys in 2002 which also have 
data on profit margin and we again find that profit margin by itself is not significantly associated 
with bribe payments whereas innovation is. The 2002 surveys also have data on past profit/sales 
ratio in 2001 and 1999. Past profitability, both in 1999 and 2001 is significantly associated with 
                                                 
31 The same sample of countries was surveyed in 2002. The firms surveyed in 2002 and 2005 were randomly chosen 
each year and hence we have panel data on less than 1500 firms that were surveyed by coincidence in both years. 
We do not run pooled regressions across both datasets since the profitability measures were defined differently in 
the two surveys and the 2002 survey does not have the variables Tax Evasion (Wagebill) and Tax Evasion (Labor). 
However, the 2002 survey has the main tax evasion variable and controlling for profitability, we again find that 
bribe payments are associated with tax evasion. 32 
 
bribe payments but controlling for past profitability, innovation is still significantly associated 
with increased bribe payments. 
Second, we check whether our results are robust to the use of alternate bribe variables. 
The 2002 and 2005 BEEPS surveys have two other questions on bribes that could serve as 
alternate dependent variables. Firms were asked to report on a scale of 1 to 6 whether it is 
common for firms in their line of business to have to pay some irregular “additional 
payments/gifts” to get things done ” with regard to customs, taxes, licenses, regulations, services 
etc, with 1 being Never and 6 being Always. In addition, firms were asked to report on a scale of 
1 to 6 whether firms in their line of business usually know in advance about how much this 
‘additional payment/gifts’ with 1 being Never and 6 being Always. Using either of these 
alternate dependent variables, Bribes_Common and Bribes_Known, in a linear regression 
model,
32 we find our results unchanged – Innovating firms are more likely to say that it is 
common to pay bribes and to also report knowing how much this additional bribe payment is. 
This is consistent with our interpretation that, in our sample, corruption is a fee imposed on firms 
by government employees. 
7. Conclusion   
A key policy issue in development finance is to design institutions that promote innovation and 
economic growth.  In many countries there is considerable illegality in the relations between 
government officials and firms. The very institutions designed to promote commerce and ensure 
a level playing field become platforms that permit state employees to hold up firms 
opportunistically. On their part, many firms underreport revenues to the state. In this paper, we 
use a sample of 25,000 firms in 57 countries to study how the corruption by public employees 
affects innovation and firms’ own dealings with the state’s revenue authorities. We have four 
major findings: 
                                                 
32 We treat the Likert-scale measures as ordinal data and use OLS since Menard (1995) suggests that a linear 
regression is appropriate with ordinal dependent variables that have a large number of categories if we treat the 
variables as though they were measured on an interval scale. In the sociology and marketing literature, where use of 
ordinal variables from survey data is ubiquitous, it is common practice to treat ordinal variables as being continuous 
and to use ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation when the number of outcomes for the categorical dependent 
variable is greater than four. The assumption behind this is that when the number of cut-off points is greater than 
four, they may be considered to be approximately the same distance from each other.  33 
 
First, we find that innovating firms are more likely to pay bribes to government officials 
than firms that do not innovate. We find no evidence that firms that pay bribes receive better 
services from officials than firms that do not pay bribes. Executives of innovating firms spend 
more time with government officials and the time they spend with officials predicts the amount 
of bribes that they pay. Thus, government corruption affects innovating firms disproportionately. 
We also find small, young and individual or family owned firms pay more bribes than larger, 
older firms and firms with other ownership structures. 
Second, we find an association between bribes paid and tax evasion. More specifically, 
we find that firms that spend a lot of time dealing with non-tax government officials and 
regulations and pay bribes to government officials also evade more taxes.  
Third, while some innovators do retaliate when extorted by evading more taxes, when we 
examine the net burden of corruption and tax evasion across firms, we find that being an 
innovator increases the probability that the firm pays bribes but does not evade taxes.  Thus, 
innovating firms are more likely to be victims of corruption and less likely to be perpetrators 
who cheat on their taxes without having to pay any bribes.  By contrast, innovative firms are not 
more likely to pay protection money to criminals. Thus, our results are consistent with the 
Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) hypothesis that government officials’ predation, as opposed 
to private predation is more costly to innovators. 
Fourth, the firm’s financing source predicts how the firm deals with the government. 
Bank financing increases the probability that the firm pays bribes but does not underreport 
income for tax purposes. By contrast, informal financing increases the probability that the firm 
misreports revenue without paying bribes.  
All our results are robust to estimating on a sub-sample of countries in Europe and 
Central Asia (BEEPS Sample) using alternate measures of tax evasion (wage-bill and labor) and 
bribes. The BEEPS sample also allows us to better able to control for firm profit margins. Taken 
together, these results point to the costs of corruption imposed on firms though some firms 
respond by evading taxes. Innovators in particular are hurt by corruption. Innovating firms and 
firms that rely on formal bank financing are more likely to be Victims who pay bribes and not 
evade taxes and less likely to be Perpetrators who don’t pay bribes but evade taxes. Thus, 34 
 
corruption is likely to have an indirect effect on innovation and the viability of the financial 
sector by indirectly subsidizing informal finance.   
More broadly, our results suggest that bribery of government officials has more complex 
consequences beyond that of a simple transaction between a corrupt official and a firm. On the 
one hand, some firms recoup the cost of the bribes by underreporting revenues. The economic 
cost of corruption for those firms might be much lower than the cost of bribes would suggest. On 
the other hand, the uneven incidence of bribes between innovating and non-innovating firms, and 
firms that use the formal financial system and firms that do not, may have an additional 
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Table 1: Bribes and Tax Evasion across Countries and Firms 
This table presents the average bribe payments and tax evasion across different country classifications and different types of firms. The variables are described as follows: Bribes is the percent of annual 
sales value that a typical firm spends on gifts or informal payments to public officials to “get things done” with regard to customs, taxes, licenses, regulations, services etc. Tax Evasion is the percentage 
of total sales the typical establishment does not report for tax purposes. To capture the net burden of corruption on firms, we construct a Firm Type variable which takes on four values: Abiders if the 
firm reports paying no bribes and evading no taxes, Perpetrators if the firm reports paying no bribes but does report evading taxes, Victims if the firm reports paying bribes but not evading taxes, and 
Retaliators if the firm reports paying bribes and evading taxes. Level of Bureaucratic Regulation is the Number of procedures required to start a business averaged over 2004-2005 from the World Bank 

























Tax Evasion >0, 
Bribes>0 
 
Panel A: Geographic Regions                
Africa  12  2.09  23.57  39.27%  25.84% 11.90% 22.98% 
East Asia Pacific  6  1.90  29.42  26.60%  21.11%  16.55%  35.74% 
Europe and Central Asia  35  1.22  14.70  41.87%  22.51%  13.66%  21.97% 
Latin America and the Caribbean  8  2.58  23.20  33.82%  30.31%  10.19%  25.69% 
Middle East and North Africa  3  3.63  26.29  30.76%  22.54%  16.29%  30.41% 
South Asia (Sri Lanka)  1  0.19  7.40  49.23%  35.08%  9.23%  6.46% 
Total  65           
Panel B: Level of Bureaucratic Regulation           
Low  Regulation  31  1.14  15.91  44.82%  23.85% 12.52% 18.81% 
High  Regulation  34  2.22  22.13  32.91%  24.42% 13.87% 28.80% 




















Tax Evasion >0, 
Bribes>0 
 
Panel C: Firm Sizes                
Small (<20)  13559  1.50  18.03  37.78%  26.91%  11.55%  23.76% 
Medium (20-99)  9107  1.46  16.92  40.40%  19.41%  15.90%  24.29% 
Large (100 and over)  6870  1.03  14.70  48.46%  15.81%  18.28%  17.45% 43 
 
  
















Tax Evasion >0, 
Bribes>0 
 
Total  29,536            
Panel D: Ownership                
Domestic 25845  139  17.52  40.15%  23.35%  13.78%  22.72% 
Foreign 3818  1.30  12.87  47.15%  13.20%  19.17%  20.48% 
Total 29663             
Panel E: Exporter Status                
Non-exporter 23312  1.43  17.13  40.23%  22.83%  13.84%  23.10% 
Exporter 6215  1.17  16.09  44.44%  19.07%  16.59%  19.90% 
Total 29527             
Panel F: Industry Sector                
Agro Industry  448  2.35  32.33  31.25%  28.13%  7.59%  33.04% 
Construction 2361  1.68  14.46  35.24%  18.64%  18.17%  27.95% 
Other 237  1.08  10.08  46.84%  15.19%  21.94%  16.03% 
Services 10950  1.15  14.32  41.97%  20.49%  14.44%  23.10% 
Manufacturing 15657  1.47  18.78  41.43%  23.58%  14.05%  20.94% 
Total 29653             
Panel G: Legal Status                
Cooperative 645  1.95  23.93  34.73%  20.47%  13.18%  31.63% 
Corporations 11683  1.23  15.42  45.64%  19.44%  14.91%  20.01% 
Sole Proprietorship  8430  1.51  18.86  36.11%  28.59%  11.44%  23.87% 
Partnership 5408  1.34  14.58  37.76%  20.34%  16.96%  24.94% 
Other 2926  1.16  19.64  46.62%  17.40%  15.96%  20.03% 
Total 29092             44 
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics and Correlations 
Panel A presents summary statistics and panel B presents the correlation matrix between the main variables of interest. The variables 
are described as follows: Bribes is constructed from firm responses to the survey question What percent of annual sales value does a 
typical firm like yours spend on gifts or informal payments to public officials to “get things done” with regard to customs, taxes, 
licenses, regulations, services etc? Tax Evasion is 1-Tax Compliance where Tax Compliance is constructed from firm responses to the 
survey question Recognizing the difficulties many enterprises face in fully complying with taxes and regulations, what percentage of 
total sales would you estimate the typical establishment in your area of activity reports for tax purposes? Informal Financing is a 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm reported that the sum of Family, Informal (e.g. moneylender), and Other financing of 
new investments or working capital is 50% or greater. Bank Financing is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm reported 
having a current bank loan or overdraft facility and 0 if the firm said it did not currently have access to a bank loan or overdraft facility. 
Innovator is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the firm developed a new product line and 0 otherwise. Capacity Utilization 
is defined as the amount of output actually produced relative to the maximum amount that could be produced with the firm’s existing 
machinery and equipment and regular shifts. Firm Size dummies take values 1 to 3 for Small firms (1-19 employees), Medium firms 
(20-99 employees), and Large firms (>=100 employees). Corporation, Partnership, Cooperative, Sole Proprietorship, and Other Legal 
Status are all dummy variables that take the value 1 if the firm is of the corresponding legal form and 0 otherwise. Firm age is the year 
of the survey -year established. Sector Dummies are 5 industry sector dummies for Agroindustry, Manufacturing, Construction, 
Services, and Other. Foreign Ownership is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm is foreign owned and 0 otherwise. 
Exporter is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm is an exporter and 0 is it is a non-exporter.  
 
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
Variable N  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Bribes 25761  1.34  4.53  0  100 
Tax Evasion  28375  17.10  25.73  0  100 
Abiders 24179  0.41  0.49  0  1 
Perpetrators 24179  0.22  0.42  0  1 
Victims 24179  0.14  0.35  0  1 
Retaliators 24179  0.22  0.42  0  1 
Informal Financing   21384  0.14  0.35  0  1 
Bank Financing  14143  0.49  0.50  0  1 
Innovator 25761  0.37  0.48  0  1 
Capacity Utilization  25761  78.80  20.40  1  106 
Labor Productivity Ratio  16978  0.84  2.25  1.68E-06  86.76 
Sales Growth  7470  0.13  0.70  -7.61  7.94 
Firm Size Dummies  25761  1.71  0.78  1  3 
Corporation 25761  0.39  0.49  0  1 
Partnership 25761  0.21  0.41  0  1 
Cooperative 25761  0.02  0.14  0  1 
Sole Proprietorship  25761  0.32  0.47  0  1 
Other Legal Status  25761  0.06  0.24  0  1 
Age 25761  15.62  15.96  0  202 
Sector Dummies  25761  1.66  0.89  1  5 
Foreign Ownership Dummies  25761  0.13  0.34  0  1 
Exporter Dummy  25761  0.21  0.41  0  1 
 
Panel B: Correlation Matrix 
   Bribes  Tax Evasion 
Informal 
Financing 
Tax Evasion  0.1379
a    
Informal Financing  0.0602
a 0.13
a  





b , and 
c represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively 
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Table 3: Corruption as a tax on Innovation 
The regression model in cols. 1-8 and 10 is Bribes / Protection Payments =  +1 Innovator +2 Capacity Utilization + 3 Sales Growth + 4 Labor Productivity + 5 Firm Size dummies + 6 Family 
Owned dummy + 7Legal Status dummies + 8Age + 9Foreign Ownership dummy+ 10 Exporter dummy + 11 Industry Sector Dummies + 12Year Dummies + 13Country Dummies + e. In col. 9 we 
estimate two stage instrumental variable regressions. The first stage regression is: Innovator  =  +1 Educated Workforce +2 Capacity Utilization + 3 Sales Growth + 4 Labor Productivity + 5 Firm 
Size dummies + 6 Family Owned dummy + 7Legal Status dummies + 8Age + 9Foreign Ownership dummy+ 10 Exporter dummy + 11 Industry Sector Dummies + 12Year Dummies + 13Country 
Dummies + e. The second stage regression is the same as in col. 1 except that innovator is the predicted value from the first stage regression. Bribes is the percent of annual sales value that a typical firm 
spends on gifts or informal payments to public officials to “get things done” with regard to customs, taxes, licenses, regulations, services etc. Protection Payments is the percent of total sales used to buy 
protection (e.g. to organized crime to prevent violence). Innovator is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the firm developed a new product line and 0 otherwise. Educated Workforce is the 
percentage of workforce that have more than 12 years of education (university or higher). Capacity Utilization is defined as the amount of output actually produced relative to the maximum amount that 
could be produced with the firm’s existing machinery and equipment and regular shifts. Sales Growth is defined as the percentage increase in sales over the past year. Labor Productivity is the ratio of 
ratio of labor productivity of the firm to the mean labor productivity in its country where labor productivity is defined as (Total Sales-Raw Material Costs)/Total Number of Workers in the previous year. 
Firm Size dummies take values 1 to 3 for Small firms (1-19 employees), Medium firms (20-99 employees), and Large firms (>=100 employees).Family Owned dummy takes the value 1 if the largest 
shareholder is an individual or family. Legal Status Dummies consist of dummy variables for the following legal forms - Corporation, Partnership, Cooperative, Sole Proprietorship (omitted category), 
and Other Legal Status. Firm age is the year of the survey -year established. Foreign Ownership is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm is foreign owned and 0 otherwise. Exporter is a 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm is an exporter and 0 is it is a non-exporter. The regressions in columns 1-8 are estimated using ordinary least squares with standard errors clustered at the 
country level. In col. 9 we report IV regressions with robust standard errors. 
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 (0.072)  (0.072)  (0.099)  (0.194)  (0.129)  (0.117)  (0.074)  (0.089)  (0.608)  (0.040) 
Capacity 









   (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001) 
Labor Productivity      -0.019                 
      (0.011)                 
Sales Growth        -0.019              
       (0.091)               
Medium -0.114  -0.101  -0.068  -0.124    -0.215  -0.116  -0.188
c -0.281
a -0.008 





















 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001) 









 (0.069)  (0.070)  (0.107)  (0.207)  (0.193)  (0.107)  (0.070)  (0.082)  (0.070)  (0.039) 
Corporation 0.074  0.063  0.075  0.158  0.157  0.237  0.083  0.091  -0.046  -0.036 46 
 
   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
























   Bribes  Bribes  Bribes  Bribes  Bribes Bribes Bribes  Bribes Bribes 
Protection 
Payments 
 (0.095)  (0.095)  (0.110)  (0.288)  (0.145)  (0.155)  (0.092)  (0.114)  (0.074)  (0.044) 
Partnership -0.002  -0.011  -0.014  0.226  -0.032  0.053  0.002  0.033  -0.080  0.021 
 (0.073)  (0.072)  (0.087)  (0.274)  (0.121)  (0.125)  (0.071)  (0.112)  (0.076)  (0.055) 
Cooperatives 0.215  0.184  -0.063  0.474  0.408  0.428  0.237  0.092  0.212  -0.048 
 (0.278)  (0.267)  (0.164)  (0.645)  (0.438)  (0.320)  (0.269)  (0.138)  (0.180)  (0.060) 
Other Legal Status  -0.059  -0.072  0.029  0.004  0.101  0.062  -0.044  -0.076  -0.111  0.029 
 (0.177)  (0.176)  (0.219)  (0.221)  (0.298)  (0.206)  (0.180)  (0.180)  (0.158)  (0.065) 
Foreign  0.003 0.015 0.145 0.302  0.157  -0.042  0.020 0.114 -0.048 0.067 
 (0.102)  (0.103)  (0.122)  (0.243)  (0.269)  (0.137)  (0.103)  (0.110)  (0.086)  (0.059) 
Exporter -0.007  -0.001  -0.034  -0.108  0.359
c -0.093  0.009 -0.028 -0.129  0.067
c 
 (0.082)  (0.083)  (0.101)  (0.179)  (0.195)  (0.112)  (0.083)  (0.090)  (0.088)  (0.036) 
Services 0.059  0.095  0.104  0.568  0.152
c   0.095  0.102  0.310
a 0.083
c 
 (0.062)  (0.063)  (0.091)  (0.613)  (0.087)    (0.063)  (0.076)  (0.099)  (0.045) 
Agro Industry  -0.005  0.010  0.339  0.527  0.477      0.269  0.172  -0.168 









 (0.096)  (0.096)  (0.130)  (0.858)  (0.141)    (0.097)  (0.116)  (0.135)  (0.045) 
Other Sector  0.350  0.352  0.603  -0.629  -0.286    0.327  0.181  0.646
b 0.040 












 (0.132)  (0.166)  (0.280)  (0.476)  (0.263)  (0.220)  (0.168)  (0.194)  (0.345)  (0.230) 
# of Firms  25761  25761  16978  7470  12745  13594  25482  18178  23564  17417 
# of Countries  57  57  53  31  57  57  57  57  55  50 
Adjusted R-sq  0.055  0.056  0.047  0.033  0.062  0.041  0.057  0.055    0.128 
First Stage F-Stat              158.93   
Anderson-Rubin 





c represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively 
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Table 4: Innovators and their interactions with Bureaucracy 
This table shows interactions between innovators and the government. Cols. 1 and 2 in each panel presents mean comparison tests 
between innovators who pay bribes and innovators who don’t pay bribes. Innovators that pay bribes are firms who report new product 
innovation and paying a percentage of their sales as gifts or informal payments to public officials. Innovators that don’t pay bribes are 
firms who report new product innovation and report paying no bribes to public officials. In Panel A, power outages, insufficient water 
supply, unavailable telephone service and transport failures are the number of days the firm experienced the corresponding service 
interruption in the last year. In Panel B, telephone connection, electrical connection, water connection, construction permit, import 
license, and operating license are the actual delay or wait in number of days in obtaining the corresponding service or approval from 
the day the firm applied for the service. In Panel C, Tax Inspectorate, Labor and Social Security, Fire and Building Safety, 
Sanitation/Epidemiology, Municipal Police, Environmental and All Agencies are the number of days spent in inspections and 

















   1  2 
  
Innovators that don't 
pay bribes 
Innovators that pay 
bribes 
Panel A. Service Interruptions       
Power Outages  11.21  17.09
 a 
Insufficient Water Supply  6.24  10.52
a  
Unavailable Tele Service  2.59  5.43
 a  
Transport Failures  2.69  3.21 
Panel B: Delays in obtaining licenses and permits    
Telephone Connection  19.3  29.19
 a  
Electrical Connection  12.23  16.29
 a 
Water Connection  21.98  25.88 
Construction Permit  38.5  61.99
 a  
Import License  9.67  12.87
 c  
Operating License  24.14  37.72
 c  
Panel C: Days spent interacting with different government agencies 
Tax Inspectorate  3.57  5.27
 a  
Labor & Social Security  2.19  2.88
 a  
Fire & Building Safety  1.6  1.72 
Sanitation/Epidemiology 2.59  3.06
 b  
Municipal Police  1.55  2.09
 a  
Environmental 1.63  1.87 
All Agencies  11.08  15.39
 a  48 
 
Table 5: Bribe Payments and Tax Evasion 
The regression model in cols. 1-3  is Tax Evasion  = 0 + 1 Bribes + 2 Capacity Utilization +  3 Firm Size dummies + 4 Family 
Owned dummy + 5Legal Status dummies + 6Age + 7Foreign Ownership dummy+ 8 Exporter dummy + 9 Industry Sector 
Dummies + 10Year Dummies + 11Country Dummies + e. Col. 4 reports two stage instrumental variable regressions where the first 
stage regression is Bribes = 0 +1 Time Spent with Government Officials +2 Capacity Utilization +  3 Firm Size dummies + 4 
Family Owned dummy + 5Legal Status dummies + 6Age + 7Foreign Ownership dummy+ 8 Exporter dummy + 9 Industry Sector 
Dummies + 10Year Dummies + 11Country Dummies + e. The second stage regression is the same as in col. 1 except that the Bribes 
variable is the predicted value of bribes from the first stage regression. Tax Evasion is the percent of annual sales that a typical firm 
under-reports for tax purposes. Bribes is the percent of annual sales value that a typical firm spends on gifts or informal payments to 
public officials to “get things done” with regard to customs, taxes, licenses, regulations, services etc. Bribes Dummy is a dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 if Bribes>0 and 0 if Bribes=0. Time spent with government officials is the percentage of senior 
management’s time in a typical week that is spent dealing with requirements imposed by government regulations including dealing 
with officials, completing forms, etc. Innovator is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the firm developed a new product line 
and 0 otherwise. Capacity Utilization is defined as the amount of output actually produced relative to the maximum amount that could 
be produced with the firm’s existing machinery and equipment and regular shifts. Firm Size dummies take values 1 to 3 for Small 
firms (1-19 employees), Medium firms (20-99 employees), and Large firms (>=100 employees).Family Owned dummy takes the 
value 1 if the largest shareholder is an individual or family. Legal Status Dummies consist of dummy variables for the following legal 
forms - Corporation, Partnership, Cooperative, Sole Proprietorship (omitted category), and Other Legal Status. Firm age is the year of 
the survey -year established. Foreign Ownership is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm is foreign owned and 0 
otherwise. Exporter is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm is an exporter and 0 is it is a non-exporter. The regressions in 
columns 1-3 are estimated using ordinary least squares with standard errors clustered at the country level. In col. 4 we report IV 
regressions with robust standard errors. 
 
 1  2  3  4 





   OLS  OLS  OLS  IV 
    
Drop firms that 
bribe tax 
authorities 
Drop firms that 
spent any time with 
tax authorities 
Bribes 0.532
a   0.389
 a 2.370
a 
 (0.084)    (0.077)  (0.690) 
Bribes Dummy    6.133
a    
   (1.360)     
Capacity Utilization  -0.037
a -0.035
a -0.030
 a -0.014 












 (0.921)  (0.944)  (1.019)  (0.748) 
Age -0.030
c -0.029
c -0.025  -0.049
a 
 (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.013) 
Family Owned  0.805  0.629  0.124  0.548 
 (0.792)  (0.803)  (0.825)  (0.655) 
Corporation -1.305  -1.458  -1.960  -0.640 






 (0.736)  (0.723)  (1.017)  (0.574) 
Cooperatives -1.289  -1.296  -0.623  -1.575 
 (1.391)  (1.388)  (1.687)  (1.627) 
Other Legal Status  -3.032  -3.170  -2.002  -1.864 
 (2.014)  (2.016)  (2.107)  (1.317) 





 (1.040)  (1.067)  (1.059)  (0.696) 
Exporter 0.384  0.210  0.381  0.608 





c represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively 
Services -1.501  -1.857  -2.245  -1.625
a 
 (1.631)  (1.671)  (1.813)  (0.499) 
Agro Industry  1.382  1.541  0.459  4.089 
 (2.786)  (2.909)  (2.744)  (4.063) 
Construction -0.541  -1.106  -1.183  -1.564
c 
 (1.327)  (1.264)  (1.663)  (0.861) 
Other Sector  -3.429
b -3.509
a -3.010
c  -2.261 






 (1.720)  (1.531)  (2.421)  (3.492) 
# of Firms  25426  25426  17938  12394 
# of Countries  64  64  64  60 
Adjusted R-sq  0.225  0.228  0.259   
First Stage F-Stat        39.73 
(0.000) 
Anderson-Rubin Wald Test        14.96 
(0.000) 50 
 
Table 6: Innovation, Bribe Payments, and Tax Evasion 
The regression model in cols. 1-4  is Tax Evasion = 0 +1 Bribes +2 Innovator + 3 Capacity Utilization +  4 Firm Size dummies + 
5 Family Owned dummy + 6Legal Status dummies + 7Age + 8Foreign Ownership dummy+ 9 Exporter dummy + 10 Industry 
Sector Dummies + 11Year Dummies + 12Country Dummies + e. Tax Evasion is the percent of annual sales that a typical firm under-
reports for tax purposes. Bribes is the percent of annual sales value that a typical firm spends on gifts or informal payments to public 
officials to “get things done” with regard to customs, taxes, licenses, regulations, services etc. Innovator is a dummy variable which 
takes the value 1 if the firm developed a new product line and 0 otherwise. Innovator is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if 
the firm developed a new product line and 0 otherwise.  Young Firms are firms less than or equal to five years old. Capacity 
Utilization is defined as the amount of output actually produced relative to the maximum amount that could be produced with the 
firm’s existing machinery and equipment and regular shifts. Firm Size dummies take values 1 to 3 for Small firms (1-19 employees), 
Medium firms (20-99 employees), and Large firms (>=100 employees).Family Owned dummy takes the value 1 if the largest 
shareholder is an individual or family. Legal Status Dummies consist of dummy variables for the following legal forms - Corporation, 
Partnership, Cooperative, Sole Proprietorship (omitted category), and Other Legal Status. Firm age is the year of the survey -year 
established. Foreign Ownership is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm is foreign owned and 0 otherwise. Exporter is a 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm is an exporter and 0 is it is a non-exporter. The regressions in columns 1-4 are 












  1 2 3  4 
   Tax Evasion  Tax Evasion  Tax Evasion  Tax Evasion 
       Drop firms that bribe tax 
authorities 
Innovator  0.973
c 0.764 0.820  0.447 
  (0.496) (0.495) (0.655)  (0.675) 
Bribes    0.516
a   0.355
a 
   (0.086)   (0.074) 
# of Firms  28375  24179    16878 
# of Countries  59  57  59  57 
Adjusted R-sq  0.197  0.188  0.238  0.230 
a, 
b, and 
c represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively 51 
 
Table 7: Firms as Victims and Perpetrators: Role of Informal Finance 
The regression model estimated is Abiders/Victims/Perpetrators/Retaliators =  +1 Innovator  + 2 Bank Financing or Informal Financing + 3 Capacity Utilization +  4 Firm Size dummies + 5 
Family Owned dummy + 6Legal Status dummies + 7Age + 8Foreign Ownership dummy+ 9 Exporter dummy + 10Industry Sector Dummies + 11Year Dummies + 12Country Dummies + e. 
Abiders takes the value 1 for Bribes=0 and Tax Evasion=0 and 0 otherwise; Retaliators takes the value 1 for Bribes>0 and Tax Evasion>0 and 0 otherwise; Perpetrators takes the value 1 for Bribes=0 
and Tax Evasion>0 and Victims takes the value 1 for Bribes>0 and Tax Evasion=0  and 0 otherwise. Innovator is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the firm developed a new product line and 
0 otherwise. Bank Financing takes the value 1 if the firm reported having access to an overdraft facility or line of credit and 0 otherwise. Informal Financing takes the value 1 if the sum of informal 
financing, family financing, and other financing of new investments was 50% or greater OR the sum of informal financing, family financing, and other financing of working capital was 50% or greater. 
Informal Financing takes the value 0 if the sum of informal financing, family financing and other financing of new investments AND working capital is equal to 0 %. Capacity Utilization is defined as 
the amount of output actually produced relative to the maximum amount that could be produced with the firm’s existing machinery and equipment and regular shifts. Firm Size dummies take values 1 to 
3 for Small firms (1-19 employees), Medium firms (20-99 employees), and Large firms (>=100 employees).Family Owned dummy takes the value 1 if the largest shareholder is an individual or family. 
Legal Status Dummies consist of dummy variables for the following legal forms - Corporation, Partnership, Cooperative, Sole Proprietorship (omitted category), and Other Legal Status. Firm age is the 
year of the survey -year established. Foreign Ownership is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm is foreign owned and 0 otherwise. Exporter is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
firm is an exporter and 0 is it is a non-exporter. The regressions are estimated using logits with standard errors clustered at the country level. 
 
Panel A: Innovation and Firm Type 















   (0.038)  (0.043)  (0.051)  (0.037) 
# of Firms  24179  24179  24155  24179 
# of Countries  57  57  56  57 
a, 
b, and 
c represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively 
 
Panel B: Innovation, Financing and Firm Type 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 

































(0.076) (0.082) (0.066) (0.070) (0.053) (0.054) (0.069) (0.052) 




a             
 
(0.068)  (0.069)  (0.097)  (0.086)             





            (0.061)  (0.067)  (0.092)  (0.069) 
# of Firms  7391 7400 7391 7400  15176  15176  15162  15176 
# of Countries  24.000 25.000 24.000 25.000 57.000 57.000 56.000 57.000 
a, 
b, and 
c represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively 
 52 
 
Table 8: Bribe Payments and Tax Evasion – Robustness using BEEPS Sample 
The regression model estimated in cols. 1-4 is  is Tax Evasion (Wage Bill)/Tax Evasion (Labor) =  +1 Bribes + 2 Sales Growth + 3 Capacity Utilization + 4 Profit Margin or Profitability Dummy + 
5 Firm Size dummies + 6 Family Owned dummy + 7Legal Status dummies + 8Age + 9Foreign Ownership+ 10 Exporter dummy + 11Industry Sector Dummies + 12Country Dummies + e.  In cols. 
5-8 we estimate two stage variable regressions where the second stage regression is the same as those in cols. 1-4 respectively except that the Bribes variable is replaced with its predicted value from the 
following first stage regression: Bribes  =  +1 Time spent with government officials + 2 Sales Growth + 3 Capacity Utilization + 4 Profit Margin or Profitability Dummy + 5 Firm Size dummies + 
6 Family Owned dummy + 7Legal Status dummies + 8Age + 9Foreign Ownership+ 10 Exporter dummy + 11Industry Sector Dummies + 12Country Dummies + e. Tax Evasion (Wagebill) is 
constructed from firm responses to the survey question “Recognizing the difficulties that many firms face in fully complying with labor regulations, what percentage of the actual wage bill would you 
estimate the typical firm in your area of business reports for tax purposes?” Tax Evasion (Labor) is constructed from firm responses to the survey question “Recognizing the difficulties that many firms 
face in fully complying with labor regulations, what percentage of total workforce would you estimate the typical firm in your area of business reports for tax purposes? Bribes is the percent of annual 
sales value that a typical firm spends on gifts or informal payments to public officials to “get things done” with regard to customs, taxes, licenses, regulations, services etc. Time spent with government 
officials is the percent of senior management’s time over the last 12 months spent in dealing with public officials about the application and interpretation of laws and regulations and to get or to maintain 
access to public services. Profit Margin is the margin by which sales price exceeds operating costs. Profitability Dummy takes the value 1 if the firm is profitable in 2003 and 0 otherwise. Capacity 
Utilization is defined as the amount of output actually produced relative to the maximum amount that could be produced with the firm’s existing machinery and equipment and regular shifts. Sales 
Growth is defined as the percentage change in sales over the past 36 months. Firm Size dummies take values 1 to 3 for Small firms (1-19 employees), Medium firms (20-99 employees), and Large firms 
(>=100 employees).Family Owned dummy takes the value 1 if the largest shareholder is an individual or family. Legal Status Dummies consist of dummy variables for the following legal forms - 
Corporation, Partnership, Cooperative, Sole Proprietorship (omitted category), and Other Legal Status. Firm age is the year of the survey -year established. Foreign Ownership is the percentage owned 
by the foreign private sector. Exporter is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm is an exporter and 0 is it is a non-exporter.  
 

















OLS  IV 
Bribes 1.913***  1.933***  1.487***  1.485***  2.798**  3.168***  1.474  1.756* 
(0.175)  (0.170) (0.165)  (0.155) (1.104)  (1.063) (1.004)  (0.954) 
Profit  Margin  0.117*** 0.081***  0.109*** 0.076*** 
(0.028) (0.028)  (0.022) (0.019) 
Profitability 
Dummy 2.912***  2.010***  2.563***  1.921*** 
(0.837) (0.680)  (0.767) (0.632) 
# of Firms  5186  5771  5207  5799  5038  5603  5061  5633 
# of Countries  27  27  27  27  27  27  27  27 
Adjusted  R-Sq  0.162  0.159 0.145  0.144 0.150  0.138 0.140  0.137 













c represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively53 
 
Appendix A: Corruption as a tax on Innovation - Robustness 
The regression model estimated is the same as in Col. 2 of Table 3. Bribes =  +1 Innovator +2 Capacity Utilization + 3 Firm Size dummies + 4 Family Owned dummy + 5Legal Status dummies + 
6Age + 7Foreign Ownership dummy+ 8 Exporter dummy + 9 Industry Sector Dummies + 10Year Dummies + 11Country Dummies + e. Bribes is the percent of annual sales value that a typical firm 
spends on gifts or informal payments to public officials to “get things done” with regard to customs, taxes, licenses, regulations, services etc. Innovation is one of the following variables: Developed a 
major new product line, Upgraded an existing product line, Introduced new technology that has substantially changed the way that the main product is produced, Opened a new plant,  Agreed to a new 
joint venture with foreign partner, Obtained a new licensing agreement, Outsourced a major production activity that was previously conducted in-house and Brought in-house a major production 
activity that was previously outsourced are all dummy variables that take the value 1 if the firm undertook the corresponding innovation and 0 otherwise; Aggregate Innovation Index is an aggregate 
measure that is formed by adding 1 if the firm has undertaken any of the eight different innovative activities described above; Core Innovation is an aggregate measure of innovation that is formed by 
adding 1 if the firm has Developed a new product line, Upgraded an existing product line, or Introduced a new technology. Capacity Utilization is defined as the amount of output actually produced 
relative to the maximum amount that could be produced with the firm’s existing machinery and equipment and regular shifts. Firm Size dummies take values 1 to 3 for Small firms (1-19 employees), 
Medium firms (20-99 employees), and Large firms (>=100 employees).Family Owned dummy takes the value 1 if the largest shareholder is an individual or family. Legal Status Dummies consist of 
dummy variables for the following legal forms - Corporation, Partnership, Cooperative, Sole Proprietorship (omitted category), and Other Legal Status. Firm age is the year of the survey -year 
established. Foreign Ownership is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm is foreign owned and 0 otherwise. Exporter is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm is an exporter and 
0 is it is a non-exporter. The regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares with standard errors clustered at the country level 
 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8  9 10 
    Bribes Bribes Bribes Bribes Bribes Bribes Bribes  Bribes  Bribes  Bribes 
New Product Innovation  0.366
a              
  (0.072)              
Upgraded Product Line    0.323
a             
    (0.070)             
New Technology      0.205
a            
     (0.058)            
Opened  new  plant      0.209           
      (0.153)           
New  Joint  Ventures       0.309
c          
       (0.171)          
New  Licensing        0.402
a        
        (0.079)         
Outsourced         0.159       
         (0.111)       
Bring in-house a previously          0 . 2 3 3      
          (0.196)     
Core  Innovation            0.185
a  
            (0.028)   
Aggregate  Innovation  Index              0.143
a 
              (0.020) 
#  of  Firms  25761 26084 26098  9497  25226 24155 25231  21361  26243  26254 
#  of  Countries  57 58 59 43 54 55 54  50  59  59 
Adjusted  R-Sq  0.056 0.056 0.055 0.056 0.057 0.061 0.057  0.078  0.056  0.056 
a, 
b, and 






Appendix B: Firms as Victims and Perpetrators: Role of Informal Finance - Robustness 
The regression model estimated is Firm Type =  +1 Innovator  + 2 Bank Financing or Self Financing + 3 Capacity Utilization +  4 Firm Size dummies + 5 Family Owned dummy + 6Legal Status 
dummies + 7Age + 8Foreign Ownership dummy+ 9 Exporter dummy + 10Industry Sector Dummies + 11Year Dummies + 12Country Dummies + e. Firm Type takes values 1 to 3, 1 for Bribes=0 
and Tax Evasion=0 or Bribes>0 and Tax Evasion>0; 2 for Bribes=0 and Tax Evasion>0(Perpetrators) and3 for Bribes>0 and Tax Evasion=0 (Victims). Innovator is a dummy variable which takes the 
value 1 if the firm developed a new product line and 0 otherwise. Bank Financing takes the value 1 if the firm reported having access to an overdraft facility or line of credit and 0 otherwise. Informal 
Financing takes the value 1 if the sum of informal financing, family financing, and other financing of new investments was 50% or greater OR the sum of informal financing, family financing, and other 
financing of working capital was 50% or greater. Informal Financing takes the value 0 if the sum of informal financing, family financing and other financing of new investments AND working capital is 
equal to 0 %. Capacity Utilization is defined as the amount of output actually produced relative to the maximum amount that could be produced with the firm’s existing machinery and equipment and 
regular shifts. Firm Size dummies take values 1 to 3 for Small firms (1-19 employees), Medium firms (20-99 employees), and Large firms (>=100 employees).Family Owned dummy takes the value 1 if 
the largest shareholder is an individual or family. Legal Status Dummies consist of dummy variables for the following legal forms - Corporation, Partnership, Cooperative, Sole Proprietorship (omitted 
category), and Other Legal Status. Firm age is the year of the survey -year established. Foreign Ownership is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm is foreign owned and 0 otherwise. 
Exporter is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm is an exporter and 0 is it is a non-exporter. The regressions are estimated using multinomial logits where the omitted category is Firm 
Type=1. The coefficients reported below are relative risk ratios.  
 
Panel A: Innovation and Firm Type 
   1 
   Firm Type 
  
(Omitted Category:  









   (0.039)  (0.061) 
# of Firms  24179 
# of Countries  57 
Log Likelihood  -2.02e+04 
a, 
b, and 
















Panel B: Innovation, Financing and Firm Type 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
   Firm Type  Firm Type  Firm Type 
  
(Omitted Category:  
Bribes=0, Evasion=0; Bribes>0, 
Evasion>0) 
(Omitted Category:  
Bribes=0, Evasion=0; Bribes>0, 
Evasion>0) 
(Omitted Category:  




















   Full Sample  Full Sample  Low and Lower-middle 
Innovator 0.885  1.186




(0.078) (0.090) (0.050) (0.089)  (0.066)  (0.068) 
Bank Financing  0.821
a 1.194
b       
(0.055) (0.107)       
Informal Financing     1.147
b 0.973 1.181
b 0.931 
   (0.072) (0.084) (0.099) (0.088) 
# of Firms  7400  15176  8323 
# of Countries  25.000  57.000  37.000 
Log Likelihood  -6019.683  -1.26e+04  -6921.374 
a, 
b, and 
c represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
 